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Abstract 
The following thesis is a qualitative case study, utilizing Congruence Analysis Approach to 
study the Transantiago, a public transportation policy implemented in Santiago, Chile on 
February 2007 that is still operating to this day.  This policy was implemented in order to ‘fix’ 
the previous public transportation system, by imitating successful Latin American public 
transportation policies, the Transmilenio (Colombia) and the BRT (Brazil).  The main 
theoretical puzzle is how this policy continued after its initial policy failure implementation 
and later evaluation on 2010.  Hence, it was studied if the policy was a success by the year 
2010 following McConnell’s (2015) conceptualization of successful policy.  Also, two 
theoretical lenses (historical institutionalism approach and rational decision making 
approaches) were compared in order to establish which theory explains more holistically the 
structure and the behavior of policymakers since its implementation until the year 2010.    It 
was concluded that the Transantiago continues to be a policy failure and historical 
institutionalism approach explains more holistically the implementation process rather than 
rational decision making approach.  The findings prove Parsons’ (1995) policy cycle theory is 
no longer relevant for studying modern policy failures and policies cannot be studied in a 
vacuum: they are affected by a myriad of factors (actors, history, contingencies, among other 
factors).   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and research question 
The following thesis will study the Transantiago, a public transportation policy implemented in 
Santiago, Chile. The Transantiago as a public policy can be conceptualized as “an integrated 
public transportation system (bus and metro) serving the metropolitan region of Chile, created 
under concession contracts awarded to private entities selected thorough competitive bidding 
processes signed with the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications” (Molina et al., 
2008, p. 2).  In Chile, before the implementation of the Transantiago, there was a lack of 
institutionalization regarding the public transportation in Santiago (Ureta, 2014). During the 
military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1989), public transportation became 
systematically deregulated (Figueroa, 2013).  When democracy returned in 1990, there was an 
attempt to regulate and institutionalize again public transportation, primarily due to the 
oversupply of uncoordinated, deregulated buses, known as micros amarillas or yellow buses 
(Witter and Hernández, 2012; Figueroa, 2013).  
Therefore, to solve the city’s public transportation problem, on the year 2000, former 
President Ricardo Lagos´s administration, designed a policy entitled ¨Policy and Plan for the 
Urban Transportation of Santiago¨ (Política y Plan de Transporte Urbano de Santiago) 
(Olavarría, 2013).   This new policy was designed in order for Santiago to have an integrated 
metropolitan public transportation system and was later renamed as Transantiago (Hales et al, 
2007).  Ricardo Lagos’ advisors formulated the Transantiago, based on successful 
transportation public policies, such as Bogota’s Transmilenio and Curitiba’s Rede Integrada de 
Transporte, in order to replicate these successful transportation public policies (Deng and 
Nelson, 2011; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007).   The Transantiago was Chile’s “universal recipe” 
for having an ideal public transportation system (Tommasi and Scartascini, 2012). 
The Transantiago’s implementation was on February 10th, 2007. February 10th, is 
considered by experts as the “Big Bang” due to its effect on citizens’ commute and daily lives 
(Olavarría, 2013; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007; Ureta, 2014).  From one the one day to another, 
“the system pretended to impose to users a completely new system, with different routes, 
different buses, a different way to manage paying tickets” (Hales et al, 2007, p. 72).  According 
to former Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications, Javier Etcheberry, the change 
of the public transportation in Santiago was as abrupt as changing a country’s currency, the 
previous currency becomes worthless (Ibid).   
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This policy was designed in order to enhance citizens’ commute and wellbeing as well 
as improving the public transportation in Santiago (Ureta, 2014). The Chilean government tried 
to imitate the Colombian transportation system (Ibid).  Nevertheless, political interest played a 
significant role in the eagerness to implement the policy, which outranked technical warnings 
and considerations from experts (Hales et al, 2007).  Initially, the Transantiago was supposed 
to be implemented on October 22nd, 2005, 50 days before the presidential elections of 2005 but 
due to the lack of infrastructure and buses, the implementation date was moved to February 
10th, 2007 (Ibid).  On the official implementation day that the Transantiago was implemented, 
there were many technical errors which could have been avoided, such as lack of supervision 
and control of bus fleets, which resulted in insufficient amount of buses to carry out citizens´ 
demands of transportation (Ibid).    
The Transantiago, as a public policy, was designed to have a permanent subsidy.  
Nevertheless, politicians informed to civil society the Transantiago would be financially self-
sufficient (MOPTT, 2000; Mardones, 2008).  However, one month after its launch, the 
government struggled to find international loans from the IDB as well from the National 
Subway and Railway companies (Mardones, 2008: Molina et al, 2008). Additionally, the Senate 
was forced to approve a permanent subsidy to the public transport (Law N°20.378) to avoid 
increasing the transportation fares (Dirección de Presupuestos, 2015).  According to 
Borndörfer, Karbstein and Pfetsch (2012) the state is forced to intervene in setting fares because 
these have a significant impact on travel choice and passenger behavior.  Yet Chilean 
policymakers did not foresee that the implementation of the Transantiago would create a 
massive evasion from dissatisfied passengers, which would later on cause the increase of 
transportation fares (Moreno, 2008; Ureta, 2014).    
This concluded in President Bachelet asking for the resignation of the Minister of 
Transportation, Sergio Espejo, whose position was replaced with René Córtazar, on March 26th, 
2007 (Ureta, 2014).  Additionally, that same day, she carried out a televised statement where 
she admitted the faults in the new policy and assumed the government´s responsibility in the 
design and implementation of the Transantiago (Ibid).  
1.2 Problem definition and research question 
The initial policy failure has been studied at great lengths by the academia.  This is due to the 
fact that there were serious structural problems which were not addressed during the design of 
this policy and were ignored by politicians, thus provoking severe difficulties in its 
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implementation (Hales et al, 2007).  Furthermore, this policy was highly unpopular within the 
civil society, thus deficiently evaluated (Olavarría, 2013; Figueroa, 2013; Ureta, 2014).  The 
public policy was an initial failure from a financial and institutional point of view.    
The main theoretical puzzle in this thesis is how the Transantiago continued after its 
initial policy failure implementation and evaluation.  Hence, to solve this conundrum, two 
theoretical lenses (historical institutionalism approach and rational decision making 
approaches) were selected. Rational decision making approach is the classical, traditional 
method to study public policies, thus studying Transantiago’s implementation through a 
concise, economical and functional step-by-step method (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; 
Parsons, 1995).   Historical institutionalism is based on the belief that history matters, that 
history has the power to affect the efficiency and efficacy of public policies (Mahoney, 2000).  
Thus, the Transantiago is studied as a social institution, in order to narrate and study in detail 
how it has evolved throughout time (Ibid). Both of these theories will be thoroughly explained 
in Chapter Two.   
 To carry out this type of analysis, the Congruence Analysis Approach (CON) will be 
utilized. CON is a small-n research design in which case studies are utilized in order “to provide 
empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance or relative strength of one theoretical approach 
in comparison to other theoretical approaches” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 144).   This 
method will be further explained in Chapter 3.  Also, it is noteworthy to explain some key 
concepts that will enable the reader to comprehend better the two theories utilized in the CON 
approach in order to shed light regarding Transantiago’s implementation process.  For example, 
the concept of incrementalism can help clarify the rational decision making approach, since it 
is as a type of analysis carried out by policymakers for establishing small solutions to a fixed 
problem within the policy (Lindblom, 1959).   Likewise, concepts such as path dependency and 
critical junctures aids the reader to comprehend historical institutional theory.  Path dependency 
theory is a theory that states that contingent events provoke institutional patterns with 
deterministic properties while as a critical juncture refers to when a specific policy option is 
selected from a myriad of alternatives, thus causing contingent events and path dependency 
(Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). 
Policymakers had very limited options after February 10th, 2007, after the critical 
juncture, therefore a new strategy was needed in order to stabilize this critical urban problem. 
This public policy was under high scrutiny from the international and local media, by policy 
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experts, by the academia and above all, by its users and the Chilean civil society.    When 
policymakers carried out incrementalist reforms and after people became habituated to this new 
policy, the Transantiago continues to be part of every day’s headlines.  As a consequence, it is 
necessary to describe how this policy works and why the process of design and implementation 
evolved in such a way.  
There are several objectives in this thesis.  The general objective is to explain the process 
of implementation of the Transantiago and its effects.  There are several specific objectives.  
First, to describe the process of implementing the Transantiago, particularly the antecedents 
and the events that followed after the implementation in order to understand understand how it 
was carried out.  Second, to explain the process of implementing the Transantiago, specifically 
how the process evolved after the “Big Bang” and what did the policymakers did in order to 
resolve this problem.  Third, to investigate and explain the effects of implementing the 
Transantiago in Santiago, Chile, specifically, the effects at an institutional level in order to 
explain why the implementation process evolved and took a certain path.  Fourth, testing 
theoretical concepts, such as incrementalism, path dependency and critical junctures, in order 
to observe if these can be utilized to explain the Transantiago’s implementation process.  
Therefore, the following thesis question is proposed: Between historical institutionalism 
and rational decision making, which theory can explain more holistically the evaluation of the 
initial three years of implementation of the Transantiago? There will be three sub-questions in 
order to respond the main question: 
1. To what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007? 
2. How did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure?   
3. To what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010? 
 
1.3 Theoretical and societal relevance 
New policies often fail and therefore this research provides insight in how to continue or 
improve after a failed initial policy launch. A policy that fails its initial expectations from the 
beginning but was able to be carried out over time with gradual changes in its design is 
interesting and relevant to study for policymakers as well as for those involved in the academia.  
It is necessary to study what is policy success and policy failure in order to establish objectively 
if the Transantiago, after three years in operation, has become a policy success or continued to 
be described by the academia as a policy failure (Ureta, 2015; Cortázar, 2015).   It has been 
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through discussed by the academia about what consists policy failure (Jenkins, 1978; Stein et 
al, 2006; Birkland, 2011; McConnell, 2010; Cortázar, 2015; OECD, 2000).  There isn’t a 
universal indicator to measure policy success or policy failure because not all policies are alike, 
they differ in their policy’s goals, the country where the public policy is being carried out and 
the sector (transportation, health, education, among others).   
McConnell (2015, p. 222) narrates that policy failure seem pervasive because there is 
“no policy sector or country appearing immune to the operational challenges and political 
pitfalls of failure”.  As McConnell (2010) also recounts, policy failure or success depends 
additionally of the context, from the eye of the beholder.  Therefore, when a policy cannot fulfill 
the goals it was meant to carry out, a new policy must take place or new measures have to 
carried out to improve it. Thus, by studying a policy that failed in accomplishing its goals, this 
will shed light regarding policy failure and recovery from policy failure in the public 
transportation sector in Latin America and which theory can explain these cases more 
holistically (historical institutionalism approach or rational decision making approach). 
From the academic point of view, it is attractive to study this case from the perspective 
of policy implementation, such as testing concepts and applying them.  It is theoretically 
relevant to study these concepts (incrementalism, path dependency and critical juncture) and 
observe until what length these can explain the process of implementing a public policy, such 
as the Transantiago.   Also, it is noteworthy to compare historical institutionalism and rational 
decision making approach in order to study which perspective can explain better the case, the 
recovery from policy failure and the continuation of the policy per se.    
Furthermore, there is an added value of applying these concepts to the study of this case 
because most of the papers written about these concepts, such as incrementalism, are American 
or European cases and not from Latin America.  Therefore, it is pertinent to study if for example, 
incrementalism as a tool has aided in the implementation of the Transantiago. Maybe one of 
the obstacles for academics, regarding the subject of studying Latin American public policies 
is the language barrier or the ability to understand the political context.  Eckstein (1992) states 
that an investigator has a special advantage if they have singular knowledge and cultural 
verstehen associated with the subject of investigation.  Therefore, as an academic who 
understands Spanish and is well versed regarding this case, it has more probability of 
responding the thesis question holistically.   As a consequence of the former, there will be a 
contribution to the existing literature, establishing if the application of concepts and theories 
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from the Public Administration field can or cannot explain a Latin American’s public 
transportation policy implementation.    
Therefore, it will enrich the existing literature and encourage other academics to study 
this subject.  Academics specialized in public policies on transportation can compare the 
Chilean case with other countries’ transportation policies (comparing public transportation 
policies within Latin America or comparing it with other countries, such as the United States).  
Additionally, if these concepts and theories can explain well the case of the Transantiago, then 
these same concepts can be utilized to understand better other public transportation policies in 
other countries.     
Additionally, many academics have studied this policy from different angles (some 
seminal works includes those written by Mardones, 2008; Molina et al., 2008; Hales, 2007; 
Figueroa and Orellana, 2007), nevertheless, many of these were published during the 
implementation process when instrumentalist fixes hadn’t been fully applied.  Consequently, 
this study will update and enrich the literature by demonstrating how the implementation 
process of the Transantiago was carried until present day.  Also, for academics, the application 
of these theories makes the Transantiago a classic textbook example for students and teachers 
about what not to do regarding public policy design, implementation and evaluation.  It gives 
students in the classroom the ability to brainstorm what possible solutions could the Chilean 
government have done to avoid such an outcome in public policy implementation. Moreover, 
this case is relevant because it is unique: it is the study of how policymakers tried to implement 
a successful foreign public transportation policy inefficiently, thus provoking the public 
transportation in Santiago to follow a certain path dependency and forcing policymakers to 
utilize an incrementalist approach in order to stabilize an urban and social problem.       
The Transantiago is a case that needs to be studied by policymakers because it teaches 
a lesson of what not to do. And also how to ‘recover’ from policy failure.  Just because a policy 
is successful in one country, like Colombia, does not mean it will be successful in another.   
1.4 Thesis outline 
This thesis will be composed of seven chapters.  The first chapter is the introduction chapter.  
The second chapter is the theoretical framework chapter, where there will be a revision of 
fundamental concepts to explain the Transantiago as a public administration case as well as the 
main two theories (historical institutionalism and rational decision). The third chapter is the 
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methodological chapter, which will be focused on the methodology utilized in this thesis.  In 
such chapter, there will be an in depth explanation of the CON approach as well as document 
analysis.   
The analysis of the data will be divided into three chapters.  Therefore, the fourth chapter 
will be based on the analysis of the fulfillment of Transantiago’s goals until the year 2007 in 
order to respond the first sub-question, ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or 
a policy success in 2007?’  The fifth chapter will be based on the study of the three predictions 
established in the theoretical chapter (structure, the role of the policymaker and objectives 
(which are in explained in great detail in chapter 2) and they will be compared with rational 
decision making approach and historical institutionalism approach.  Through this analysis this 
chapter will be able to respond the second sub-question ‘how did the policy implementation 
continue after the initial failure?    The sixth chapter will be based on the analysis of fulfillment 
of Transantiago’s goals until the year 2010 in order to respond to the third sub-question ‘to what 
extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010?’  
 The seventh chapter is the conclusion chapter, in which based on the responses of the 
previous three chapters, the thesis main question ‘between historical institutionalism and 
rational decision making, which theory can explain more holistically the evaluation of the initial 
three years of implementation of the Transantiago?’ is answered.   Later on, there is the 
bibliography and the list of appendix.     
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
In this second chapter, the theoretical framework for this thesis will be presented.   What a 
policymaker observes depends on what he or she is looking for and the lens that he or she might 
be using (Hall, 2016).  Therefore, in this section, there will be a description of several key 
concepts in order to be able to abstractly comprehend a policy from certain perspective or 
paradigm. This chapter will be divided into three sections to fully comprehend the distinctions 
between two main lines of thought (rational decision-making approach and historical 
institutionalism approach).    These three sections are: outcomes of a public policy; structure of 
a public policy and the role of the policymaker.  
2.1.  Public Policies, Institutions and Policy Success and Policy Failure 
 2.1.1 Origin and definition of a public policy  
In order to understand the concept of public policy, it is necessary to study its origin, through 
the concept of institution.  Institutions are usually the unit of analysis of seminal works in Public 
Administration and in Political Science.  According to Douglas North (1990, p. 3), institutions 
“are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction.  In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic”.    He states that in order to understand historical change, 
it is necessary to understand institutions.  This is due because “institutional change shapes the 
way societies evolve over time” (Ibid).  North (1990, p. 4) states that institutions “include any 
form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interactions”.  Institutions can be 
formal constraints (rules that people prescribe) or informal constraints (codes of behavior and 
conventions) and these can evolve over time or be created spontaneously.  Hall (2016, p. 40) 
states that institutions are the product of social coalitions and are “composed of actors powerful 
in the relevant arena and persist only as long as they retain an ample supporting coalition, even 
if the composition of that coalition changes over time”. 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that an organization and an institution are not 
the same concepts.  An organization also “provides a structure to human interaction” (North, 
1990, p. 3).  Within an organization, there are “groups of individuals bound by some common 
purpose to achieve objectives” (Ibid, p. 5). Organizations can have political bodies (for 
example, political parties); social bodies (for example, churches), educational bodies (for 
instance, universities) and economical bodies (cooperatives) (Ibid).  By studying organizations, 
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there is the possibility of analyzing a “governance structures, skills, and how learning by doing 
will determine the organization’s success over time” (Ibid).  Organizations have multiple 
features such as existing and evolving due to existing institutional framework and influencing 
the evolution of institutional framework evolves (Ibid).  According to Robbins (1991, p. 4) an 
organization is a “consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, 
that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals”. 
Greenwood and Hinnings (1996, p. 1025) stated that from an institutional perspective, 
“regularized organizational behaviors are the product of ideas, values, and beliefs that originate 
in the institutional context”. 
In spite of the unanimous agreement regarding a universal definition of institution, there 
have been disagreements within the academic community associated with a common definition 
of public policy (Howlett et al, 2009; Dye, 1998; Easton, 1953; Laswell and Kaplan, 1970; 
Jenkins, 1978).  According to Dye, it is futile to search for a “proper” definition of public policy. 
Some famous definitions of public policy include public policy as “the authoritative allocation 
of values for the whole society” (Easton, 1953, p. 129) and as a “projected program of goals, 
values, and practices” (Laswell and Kaplan, 1970, p. 71). 
Dye (1998, p. 2) has a more succinct definition of public policy, stating that it is 
“anything a government chooses to do or not to do”.  Furthermore, this author states that the 
primary agent in the formulation in the creation of public policies is the government, whose has 
the main responsibility of selecting choices and decisions on behalf of its civil society.  His 
definition is useful in the field of social sciences because they state that it should also be 
considered a public policy when a government chooses to take a negative or a non-decision, a 
stance of doing nothing, maintaining the status quo (Ibid).  
A positive decision is when governments decide to change the status quo (Ibid).  Both 
positive and negative decisions are conscious and deliberate decisions (Ibid).  A government’s 
decisions and actions frequently produce unintended consequences (Dye, 1998; Howlett et al, 
2009).  The unintended consequences of a public policy are not a public policy in itself, just an 
unexpected by-product with productive or counterproductive results (Dye, 1998). Public 
policies have the function of organizing bureaucracies, extracting taxes, regulating behavior 
from society and distributing benefits (Ibid). 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009, p. 4) use a more technical definition of public policy 
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and its formulation as policy-making “is a techno-political process of defining and matching 
goals and means among constrained social actors”.  They add that governments are the 
institutions that formulate public policy (Ibid).  These authors establish that public policies are: 
Intentional government actions containing both some articulated goal or 
goals-however poorly the goals may in fact have been identified, justified, 
and formulated-and some means to achieve them-again, notwithstanding 
how well or poorly the means have in fact been connected to the goal(s).  
They also have sub-concepts in order to explain in further detail who implements public 
policies and where the process of policy making takes place (Ibid). They state that policy 
universe is the actors who are involved and participate in the agenda-setting and that the policy 
subsystem is related to those actors who take decisions regarding which option will be 
implemented, these can be bureaucrats, officials or judges (Ibid).   
Agenda-setting is the place where any and all policy actors can participate in defining 
problems and asking for government intervention (Ibid).  Jenkins (1978) formulates his 
definition based on the content of policies, such as the goals, rather than the actors or the place 
where these take place.  He defines public policy as a “set of interrelated decisions taken by a 
political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving 
them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power 
of those actors to achieve” (Ibid, p. 15).    
Public policy can be evaluated through their outcomes: if a policy fails or succeeds.  In 
Public Administration, this is studied through the concept of policy success and failure.  These 
concepts have been very scrutinized because there are many points of view regarding what 
consists a failure in policy (Walsh, 2006, McConnell, 2015; McConnell, 2010; Stein et al, 
2006).  McConnell (2015), Birkland (2011) and Ingrm and Mann (1980) all agree that the 
evaluation of policy failure or success can be highly subjective. McConnell (2015, p. 351) also 
states that “success is in the eye of the beholder, depending on factors such as a protagonist’s 
values, beliefs and extent to which they are affected by the policy”.  Ingram and Mann (1980) 
narrate that the concepts of success and failure are highly subjective concepts which can reflect 
a person’s perception of needs, goals and psychological character toward life. 
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 2.1.2 Definition of a successful public policy 
Parallel to the debate in the academic community regarding the establishment of a universal 
definition of public policy, there is also a quarrel within the academia about establishing a 
universal definition of policy success and policy failure.  McConnell (2015) clarifies the debate 
by studying the question “failure for whom?” because a failed policy in a specific sector does 
not necessary means that it is a failed policy if it does not affect people from another sector.   
McConnell (2015) states: 
 A policy that failed to deliver benefits for one group may be successful for 
another.  (…) If a policy fails some groups/stakeholders but brings successes 
for others, there is a real difficulty in weighing-up these complex outcomes 
and ascertaining which matters most (p. 229).     
Likewise, McConnell (2015) affirms that there are degrees of failure, policies cannot 
be seen through a black and white photo, there are also shades of grey.  A public policy can 
also be evaluated as a failure due to temporality issues.   A policy can be considered a failure 
or a success depending on when it is evaluated during the path of its policy cycle multiple 
points in the policy cycle (Ibid). There are two approaches for measuring failure and success: 
the rational scientific tradition and the interpretivist, constructivist, discursive tradition (Ibid).  
The rational scientific tradition states that a policy fails when it hasn’t reached its objective 
goal (Ibid).  The interpretivist, constructivist, discursive tradition states that failure is based 
on individual interpretations (Ibid).  McConnell (2010, p. 356-357) defines “failure as the 
mirror image of success: a policy fails if it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out 
to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent”. 
While McConnell (2015) establishes that a policy success is based on the fulfilment 
of objectives and support from civil society, many other authors do not agree with his 
definition.  For example, Cortázar (2015) establishes that a policy can be deemed successful 
if it had an efficient design and if there was a consensus of political actors associated with the 
design of the policy.  Hence, the central theme behind the success of a reform is the ability to 
build an ample political and technical consensus through good administration and leadership 
in order for a policy to be implemented efficiently (Ibid). Good administration and leadership 
are the tools policymakers utilize in order to deal with civil and political actors who are 
unhappy with a policy.  Good administration refers to the capacity of putting the necessary 
resources in order to achieve efficiently and efficacy established objectives (Ibid).  Leadership 
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refers to choosing with accuracy which are the priorities (Ibid). Thus, opposing McConnell’s 
conceptualization of policy success, Cortázar believes that a successful policy needs more 
than society’s approval or the fulfillment of its initial objectives.    
The author states that there are four different options in order to establish the 
constructions in agreements in public policy, hence achieving policy success.  These options 
are win-win, win-lose, lose-win and sum zero (Ibid).  The win–lose solution is when an actor 
leaves the scene in order to improve the situation of the whole.  Other solution, lose-win, takes 
place “in order to exit a crisis, an actor must improve the relationship with another actor or at 
least not deteriorate it even if it comes by paying a cost”1 (Ibid, p. 103).   
Another option is the win-win angle, the most favorable by policymakers, which 
consists of permitting and encouraging “the cooperation between different actors to find a 
solution to a crisis”2 (Ibid: 104).  For Cortázar, it is important to aim for a win-win approach, 
depending also on which variable or goal the government is trying to achieve (Ibid).  The win-
win option is more probable to happen when there is loyalty among political actors (Ibid).   The 
sum zero option is the least popular option among policymakers to reach consensus, thus, 
considered as inappropriate is not option because it is associated with badly focused 
negotiations, lack of competitively, where every political actor loses (Ibid).  
Yet there are numerous explanations for explicating the reasons why a policy fails in 
the first place.  A policy can fail when it does not fulfill its initial goals.  Walsh (2006) states 
that policy failure occurs when the policymaker discovers that the present policy is no longer 
accomplishing the program’s proposed goals.  For Walsh (2006) policymakers are driven by 
their long term political interests, hence the policy fails when it obstructs the policymakers’ 
capacity to achieve their political ambitions.   Public policies can fail when they haven’t been 
able to address their ‘target groups’ (McConnell, 2015).  This means that the policy was unable 
to alter the behavior or the environment of the ‘target group’ (Ibid). 
Additionally, public policies can fail when they do not receive enough support from 
political actors in order to efficiently implement them.  When there is opposition and policies 
cannot be implemented, then a policy can be considered as a policy failure (McConnell, 2010). 
Furthermore, when there is lack of authority or low levels of political support associated to a 
                                                
1 Free translation by the researcher. 
2 Free translation by the researcher. 
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specific policy, then the policy itself becomes politically unviable, with low probability of 
success which in addition, encourages a drift among political actors (Walsh, 2006).  When these 
constraints become absent, then policymakers can successfully implement new policies (Ibid).   
For Stein, Tommasi, Echebarría, Lora and Payne (2006), public policies fail not only when they 
do not obtain the support from government actors but also when they do not receive the support 
and approval from its citizens.  Thus, a failed public policy can be perceived when they fail to 
“incorporate and respond to the needs and demands of all the citizens, resulting in vast sectors 
of the population being excluded from the benefits of growth” (Ibid, p. 115). 
Sometimes, policy failure does not cause change in the policy itself because 
policymakers may lack coherent academic associations between desired outcomes and policy 
tools (Walsh, 2006).  Thus, a policy may continue to exist or they’re just adjusted cosmetically 
or their origins of failure are not addressed (Ibid).  Blaming policy direction or its timing of 
implementation for a failed policy, is an insufficient explanation (Ibid).  Walsh states that some 
policies are masked as failed policies in order to create ‘change’, hence offering new politically 
enticing alternative policies for politicians, which as a consequence, gains the support from 
other influential actors (Ibid). Thus, a policy does not have to fail in order for policymakers to 
create new policies.  A change in public policy can also occur when it is no longer the interest 
of actors to reproduce given public policy (Mahoney, 2000; Walsh, 2006).   
Policy failure can also occur due to institutional reasons.  According to Birkland (2011, 
p. 266) there is a problem with the assumption in top-down models that only a single national 
government can “successfully structure policy implementation and provide for direct delivery 
of services”.  He states that most policies formulated by a government require significant 
amount participation from local government (Ibid).    Birkland (2011) describes the paradigm 
of “if it isn’t broken, then don’t fix it” to explain the resistance of a government to change a 
successful policy.  Underlying weakness in democratic processes can similarly affect the ability 
of a government in the delivery of public goods and carrying out public policies (Stein et al, 
2006, p. 115).   Nevertheless, Stein, Tommasi, Echebarría, Lora and Payne (2006) narrate that 
an institutional setting that permits the president to pass their agenda isn’t a sufficient condition 
in order to produce successful public policies.    
A public policy becomes successful when it reaches its goal achievement and when 
“those who regard the original goal as desirable are likely to perceive its achievement in this 
way” (McConnell, 2015, p. 351). Therefore, McConnell merges these two approaches in order 
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to formalize the definition of a successful public policy.  Hence, he states that a policy is 
successful is only if “it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no 
criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually universal” (Ibid).  Nevertheless, some 
programs that do reach their target goals do not necessarily are associated with political success, 
it may even hinder political interests (McConnell, 2010).  For example, an efficient public 
policy my thwart leadership or electoral ambitions and influence negatively government 
agendas (Ibid).  Failure does not always produce change; instead, its effects are mediated by 
the interests of important constituents and alternative policies’ accounts of past failures, and 
either of these can block the adoption of a new policy (Walsh, 2006: 499). 
2.2 Structure of policies: different schools of thought 
 2.2.1    Rational Decision Making Approach 
There are many forms of analysis of policies.  The classical analysis of a public policy is through 
the ‘rational decision-making approach’.  In the 1960’s, Political Science had the main task of 
studying power: the process of decision making and how to improve “the capacity of 
government to do things and ‘solve problems” (Parsons, 1995, p. xvi).  Thus, a line of thought 
named as ‘stagist’ or ‘rational decision-making’ was established (Ibid).  This type of approach 
can be observed as a very instrumental, concise, functionalist and economist way of carrying 
out public policies (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993: March and Olsen, 1984; 
Parsons, 1995).   
According to Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993), the best way to study public policy 
making is by studying public policy as a step-by-step method.  This analysis starts with the 
identification of how policy problems occur and how they materialize on the political agenda.  
This step-by-step process involves the analysis of “how political actors formulate issues for 
action, how legislative or other action ensues, how administrators subsequently implement the 
policy, and how policy is evaluated” (Ibid, p. 10).    Hales (2016) states that politics is a 
structured process in which political actors’ behaviors are conditioned as well as the outcomes 
of their political interactions due to numerous variables. Consequently, the main objective in 
this line of thought is to ‘solve’ the identified problems or issues in the agenda to later on solve 
other problems identified by the policymaker (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Hales, 2016; 
Parsons, 1995).  For Parsons (1995, p. xvi), this line of thought is associated with the concept 
of analysis of a policy process, which he defines as “how problems are defined, agendas set, 
policy formulated, decisions made and policy evaluated and implemented”. This approach 
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establishes the “policy-making process as composed of a series of steps or sequences” (Ibid, p. 
39).  
Model 1: Policy cycle under the rational decision-making approach 
 
Diagram from Parsons book (1995, p. 77) 
In model 1, it can be observed Parsons’ (1995, p. 77) circle diagram, where he illustrates 
how this policy process works.  First, there is a problem that arises, second the problem has 
been defined, third, alternative responses and solutions are identified, later the evaluation of the 
options take place (Ibid).  After the former step, a selection of a policy option is carried out, the 
implementation of the policy takes place, then an evaluation of that policy is established and 
the cycle starts over if a new problem is exposed by the policymaker.   This type of method of 
analyzing a public policy has received criticisms by establishing that the implementation 
process and agenda building are not separate entities, they sometimes clash into each other 
(Thelen, 2004).  Also, policy evaluation, which is in this paradigm, the final step of the process, 
“does not actually constitute a ‘step’ in policy making unless it throws light on possible next 
moves in policy, in which case evaluation becomes intertwined with all other attempts to 
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appraise and formulate options for reshaping government activity” (Ibid: 10).  The stagist model 
or the textbook approach has also been viewed as an artificial interpretation of the policy 
making process (Parsons, 1995). 
 2.2.2 Historical Institutionalism 
The second school of thought that shall be utilized to study the structure of a policy is through 
the analysis of historical institutionalism.  This type of approach originates from the theory of 
new institutionalism.  Institutionalism and new institutionalism are very broad concepts, 
utilized in many disciplines and each with a different definition (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).  
In this thesis, new institutionalism is associated with the discipline of Public Administration 
and Political Science.  Specifically, this concept focuses focuses on “how and why institutions 
evolve, on the processes of institutional reproduction, and on institutionalization” (Gorges, 
2001, p. 155). 
Institutionalization can be defined as “the process whereby social processes, 
obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1991, p. 43).  New institutionalism has also been characterized by a ‘new’ 
revived interest from the academia regarding the subject of institutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991).   This ‘renaissance’ has been seen as a “reaction against the behavioral revolution of 
recent decades, which interpreted collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate 
consequence of individual choice” (Ibid, p. 2).  It is a revival of old questions from the areas of 
opportunity to challenge the deterministic point of view of studying institutions through 
macrosociology, cultural studies and social history, that were not answered because in the 
1950’s-1960’s it was considered more appropriate for policymakers to focus on the importance 
of studying institutions from a functionalist, economist point of view (Ibid).  Thus, thanks to 
new insights from anthropology, history and continental social theory, there is a new 
individualistic or functionalistic values (Ibid).  As a consequence, from the paradigm of ‘new 
institutionalism’, arises historical institutionalism.    
Sanders (2008, p. 39) defines historical institutionalism as a theory from social sciences 
that has the main assumption that it is more educational to investigate human political 
interactions within the environment of rule structures created by individuals and “sequentially, 
as life is lived, rather than to take a snapshot of those interactions at only one point in time, and 
in insolation from the rule structures (institutions) in which they occur”. This current, through 
a historical analysis of institutions, studies institutions’ origins and development and its 
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relationship to behavior and policy (Ibid).  Historical institutionalism’s main concern and 
objective is the construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions rather than individual 
preferences and rational choice activities (Ibid).  Historical institutionalism is “concerned with 
the long term evolution and outcome (intended or not) of a welter of interactions among goal-
seeking actors, both within institutions, and with their challenges outside” (Ibid, p. 42).   
To comprehend the structure of the line of thought of historical institutionalism, it is 
necessary to conceptualize path dependence and critical junctures.  According to Pierson (2000: 
251), path dependence theory “is a social process grounded in a dynamic of ‘increasing 
returns’”.   Path dependence is utilized to explain particular patterns of timing where the 
sequence matters, initializing from comparable circumstances where there are probable 
numerous social outcomes (Ibid).  Sizable consequences may occur due to contingent or ‘minor’ 
events, whose specific course of action, once taken, can be impossible to reverse.   Mahoney 
and Schensul (2006, p. 455-456) state that path dependence may “involve reaction-counter-
reaction dynamics, such that an initial event triggers a reaction and thereby logically leads to 
another quite different event, which triggers its own reaction and so on, until a particular 
outcome of interest is reached”.   They develop their argument stating that when a particular 
outcome takes places, this is subjected to a self-reproducing mechanism, “causing the outcome 
to endure across time, even long after its original purposes have ceased to exist” (Ibid, p. 456).  
Besides its self-reproducing mechanism, it also has a reaction-counter-reaction dynamics (Ibid).    
Nevertheless, there is a debate in the academic community regarding how history 
matters and the need of a formal definition of path dependence (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006; 
Pierson, 2000; Sanders, 2008; Dye, 1998, among other authors).  Quite often, path dependence 
is defined as “‘history matters’ or that ‘the past influences the future’” (Mahoney, 2000, p.  
507).  Thus, Mahoney and Schensul (2006: 457) propose six characteristics to define path 
dependence: “the past affects the future; initial conditions are causally important; contingent 
events are causally important; historical lock-in occurs; a self-reproducing sequence occurs; a 
reactive sequence occurs”.  Mahoney (2000, p. 507-508) states that in order to identify path 
dependence, it is necessary to both trace “a given outcome back to a particular set of historical 
events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be 
explained on the basis of proper historical conditions”.     
 Path dependence is utilized to explain particular outcomes, often seen as instances of 
‘exceptionalism’ or ‘deviant outcomes’ where a case whose predicted outcome by theory did 
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not occur (Mahoney, 2000).  Mahoney (2000, p. 509) defines reactive sequences in order to 
explain “the chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events”.  Sequences are 
‘reactive’ because “each event within the sequence is in part a reaction to temporally antecedent 
events thus, each step in the chain is “dependent” on prior steps” (Ibid).  The final event in a 
reactive sequence is the outcome studied by social scientists, where a chain of events leads to a 
path with a certain result (Ibid).  In order for a reactive sequence to pursue a specific path-
dependent path, the event that initializes the sequence must have contingency properties and 
sequentially (Ibid).  For Mahoney (2000), when events lack the contingency property, they 
should not be conceptualized as path-dependent events.   It is significant to highlight that within 
a reactive sequence, “each event in the sequence is both a reaction to antecedent events and a 
cause of subsequent events” (Ibid, p.  526). 
An example of an institutional self-reproducing mechanism is how the Greek, French 
and United Kingdom’s Parliaments addressed the challenge of European integration through a 
path dependent, incremental manner (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001).  This can be justified that the 
small steps carried out by these governments’ policymakers are self-reinforcing feedback 
mechanisms that impediment institutions to investigate other solutions (Ibid).  A second 
example of an institutional self-reproducing mechanism is the approval of the Maastricht 
Treaty by the French National Assembly and Senate (Ibid).  The French approval of the treaty 
is a self-reproducing behavior because the French government has been progressively more 
involved in European politics over the years (Ibid). 
Furthermore, the concept of path dependence has not only been studied from the field 
of political science but also in the field of economics.  As path dependence has the characteristic 
of   self-reinforcing properties, where “initial steps in a particular direction induce further 
movement in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse 
direction” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 512).  Economists named the self-reinforcing property as 
‘increasing returns’, which can correspondingly be described as positive feedback processes 
(Ibid). There has been an academic debate regarding if increasing returns is the origin of path 
dependence (Pierson, 2000).  Academics propose that increasing returns is the origin of path 
dependence because the costs of changing between alternatives will, in some social contexts, 
may augment over time and the sequence and timing of events influence the narrowing of 
choices that can be taken over time (Ibid).  As a consequence, through the increasing return 
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concept, path dependence is not only about the content of change but also about temporality, in 
other words, when the change occurs (Ibid).  
Historical institutionalism is also concerned about the concept of critical juncture. There 
is more agreement among the academia regarding the concept of critical juncture (Mahoney, 
2000; Collier and Collier, 1991; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006).  For Mahoney (2000), a critical 
juncture can be defined as the selection of a specific institutional arrangement from an 
assortment of two or more institutional options (Mahoney, 2000).  These junctures are bestowed 
with the adjective ‘critical’ because “once a particular option is selected it becomes 
progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still 
available” (Ibid, p. 513).   Collier and Collier (1991) are famous for utilizing critical junctures 
associated with studies where the unit of analysis are countries.  Thus, they define critical 
juncture as a “period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different 
countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” 
(Ibid, p. 29).   While Thelen (2004, p. 27) applies this concept to politics in general when she 
points out that “once a path is taken, previously viable alternatives become increasingly remote, 
as the relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern”. 
Mahoney (2001) states that if there are no alternatives and only one choice can be made, 
then there is no critical juncture, thus not all choices can be considered critical junctures.  Before 
a critical juncture, there are numerous outcomes possibilities, while as after the critical juncture, 
the range of events becomes considerably narrowed (Ibid).   Critical juncture is associated with 
path dependence because the choices actors take are linked to prior processes and events 
(Collier and Collier, 1991).  Within path-dependent analysis, critical junctures are contingent 
instances where unexpected events can have a future impact on the final result (Mahoney, 
2001).  Critical junctures are especially useful for historical researchers, it permits them to avoid 
the issue of infinite explanatory regression into the past, “this problem arises when analysts lack 
criteria for establishing a meaningful beginning point of analysis and keep reaching back in 
time for ultimate causes that underlie subsequent events and outcomes” (Ibid: 113). Thus, 
through critical junctures, the researcher concentrates on specific events in history where the 
range of possible results is narrower (Ibid).   
Mahoney and Schensul (2006, p. 461) state that critical junctures usually develops 
immediately after initial conditions, “it is closer in time to the initial conditions than to the final 
outcome”. Butenschøn (2015, p. 112-113) states that critical junctures are an evolutionary 
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concept utilized in both social and natural sciences where an equilibrium has been altered by 
intense events over a short period of time, thus the system has an opportunity to change towards 
a radical direction.   Collier and Collier (1992) goes through neither a quick change or a slow 
change, they can vary greatly: some can be associated to antecedent conditions while some are 
not; some can occur simultaneously across numerous, that it can be an immediate change or 
one that lasts through several years.  
Model 2: Policy cycle under the historical institutionalism approach 
 
 Model created by researcher 
In model 2, the policy cycle under the historical institutionalism approach is presented. 
As it can be observed, it is a figure that is larger in the beginning and grows narrower over time.  
Just like a tree trunk, the bottom of the figure is very wide.  Just like when a tree branch grows, 
it becomes narrower over time, similarly, this is what happens to a policy as well. After the first 
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identification of the policy problem or issue, there several solutions are identified.  Afterward 
the critical juncture, there is a selection of a specific policy solution. Just like the growth of a 
tree branch, which can only go forward, so is the public policy.  It can only go further with 
restricted options, it can never change back like for instance in this model, change from solution 
‘A’ to solution B’ or ‘C’.   It can only advance into ‘A1’, ‘A2’ or ‘A3’ and stay in one course 
(‘A1’).  Thus, the goal of this model is to portray the paradigm of historical institutionalism, 
where the social phenomenoms of critical juncture and path dependence can be observed.  Also, 
it is important to highlight the arrow next to the main figure of model 2, which represents how 
a policy can only go forward over time and never retrocede after the selection of a solution 
regarding a policy issue. 
 2.2.3 Predictions for structure  
After the overview of the general theoretical framework of the structure of policies within 
different schools of thought, certain predictions can be established. 
Table 2: Predictions regarding the structure of different theories 
Predictions Rational Decision Making Approach 
Historical Institutionalism  
Approach 
Structure 
The implementation process 
matches Parsons’ (1995) policy 
cycle theory 
The implementation process follows 
Mahoney’s (2000) path dependency 
theory 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Mahoney, 2000; Parsons, 1995) 
Observing Table 2, two predictions have been established, regarding the structure of policies 
under the lens of two different theoretical theories. 
Structure of policies in rational decision making approach: A policy can have an identified 
structure associated with the rational decision making approach if the policy process matches 
Parsons’ (1995) policy cycle.   
Structure of policies in historical institutionalism approach: A policy can have an identified 
structure associated with the historical institutionalism approach if the policy follows 
Mahoney’s (2000) path dependency theory. 
2.3       Role of the policymaker: different schools of thought 
Policymakers can take different roles when they confront the issue of change. Weick and Quinn 
(1999) state that agents (policymakers) can have different roles, such as having a role in 
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continuous change and episodic change.  These authors conceptualize episodic change as a 
type of change that occur in organizations that is intentional, infrequent and discontinuous 
while as continuous change is a type of change that occur in organizations which is 
characterized by being cumulative, constant and evolving (Ibid).   As a consequence of these 
two types of changes within organizations, two types of roles for change agents emerge, one 
in continuous change, the other in episodic change.  In this thesis, episodic change will be 
associated with the rational decision making approach while as continuous change will be 
associated with historical institutionalism. 
 
 2.3.1     Role of the policymaker within the rational decision making approach  
First of all, it is necessary to explain how episodic change is related with the rational decision 
making approach.  Episodic change is highly associated with rational decision making 
approach because both can be described as linear and progressive models, which are motivated 
by disequilibrium, goal seeking and demands external intervention (Weick and Quinn, 1999; 
Parsons, 1999).  Hence, the change agent is in charge of three stages: unfree, transition and 
refreeze.  The state of ‘unfreeze’ is based of the failure of expectations, where there is a lack 
of psychological safety and the presence of learning anxiety (Weick and Quinn, 1999).   The 
state of unfreeze occurs due to the phenomenon that leads before it, called ‘inertia’, which they 
define as the “the inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environment” (Ibid, p.  
369).  
Episodic change tends to occur when organizations are faced with external events, 
increasing environmental demands or inertia (Ibid).  Implementing episodic change has its 
drawbacks: it tends to be infrequent, incomplete, lengthy (due to it vast scope) and disruptive 
(drastically replaces one program for another) (Ibid).  After the state of ‘unfreeze’, leads to the 
state of ‘transition’.  The state of ‘transition’ is based on a conceptual enlargement and 
improved standards of judgment where the policymaker establishes new restructuring 
cognitive redefinition of semantics (Ibid).  Finally, ‘refreeze’ is the state where the policymaker 
establishes supportive social rules in order to create changes that are congruent with the new 
change (Ibid).  
The change agent in this type of model is the protagonist of change within the 
organization, the one who carries out the policy (Ibid).  Hence, the change agent is “focused on 
inertia and seeks points of central leverage” (Ibid, p. 366).  They can be identified as change 
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agents in episodic change because they exhibit the following behavior:  
• Communicate differently by establishing alternative schema (Ibid). 
• “Reinterpret revolutionary triggers” (Ibid). 
• “Influence punctuation” (Ibid). 
• Build commitment and coordination (Ibid). 
 2.3.2     Role of the policymaker within the historical institutionalism approach 
The policymaker in historical institutionalism approach is very similar to the change agent in 
continuous change.  Continuous change, according to the Weick and Quinn, is “a redirection of 
what is already under way” (Ibid).  Furthermore, this type of change can be described as eternal, 
processional, searching for an equilibrium, cyclical and without an end date (Ibid).  
Consequently, the change agent is responsible for the undertaking of the following three stages: 
freeze, rebalance and unfreeze.  The state of ‘freeze’ can be observed as making visible 
sequences and demonstrating “visible and show patterns through maps schemas, and stories” 
(Ibid).  Later on, the stage of ‘rebalance’ is based on the use of attraction, where the policymaker 
is focused on reinterpreting, relabeling and remodeling “the patters to reduce blocks” (Ibid).  
The last stage, ‘unfreeze’, is where the policymaker resumes “resume improvisation, 
translation, and learning in ways that are more mindful” (Ibid). 
Weick and Quinn (1999) state that continuous change takes place in the presence of 
organizational instability and contingencies, such as after contingent events and critical 
junctures (Mahoney, 2000).  As a consequence, when studying continuous change under the 
lens of historical institutionalism, it can be observed that policymakers face those same 
instabilities and contingencies after a critical juncture. Therefore, as seen in model 2, once 
policy ‘A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’ is selected, the policymaker has to redirect change in the current selected 
policy choice (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Mahoney, 2000).  Remembering that in that model, 
solution ‘A’ was selected, the policymaker can try to carry out intentional change in the 
margins of such policy ‘A’, through establishing ‘A1’, ‘A2’ or ‘A3’, but it may create a new 
change or in other words return to alternative ‘B’ or ‘C’ (Mahoney, 2000; Weick and Quinn, 
1999).   
Policymakers in continuous change are forced to follow a certain path as institutions 
are always evolving in a consistence, cumulative manner (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Sanders, 
2008).  Pierson (2000) mentions Levi’s ideas (1997) about the application of path dependence, 
the costs of reversal become extremely elevated if a country or region follow a certain path.  
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Boushey (2010) also establishes that policy innovations do not always go through a clear path 
trajectory.   Thus, since the change agent is in a fixed route due to the lack of options that such 
organization is facing, they must utilize creative tools such as encouraging improvisation, 
learning and translation in order to carry out to completion a successful public policy.   
The change agent in this type of model is the not the protagonist of change within the 
organization, they have to redirect the change that is already under way.  A continuous change 
agent can be recognized through the following behaviors: 
• “Recognizes, makes salient and reframes current patterns” (Ibid). 
• Utilizes different language, thus altering meaning in certain parts of a policy 
(Ibid). 
• Utilize different language to enrich dialogue and grant new identity to the 
policy (Ibid). 
• “Unblocks improvisation, translation, and learning” (Ibid). 
• Carries out intentional change at the margin of the policy (Ibid). 
This last behavior, the ‘intentional, small change’ is associated with the theories of path 
dependence and incrementalism.   Academics have discussed in depth the relationship between 
path dependence theory and incrementalism (Mahoney, 2000; Hay, 2011; Dimitrakopoulos, 
2001; Kirk et al, 2007).  Incrementalism, as a concept, was first coined by Lindblom in 1959.  
Lindblom defines incrementalism through three types of analysis.  He names these incremental 
analysis, disjointed analysis and strategic analysis.  Incremental analysis is an “analysis that is 
limited to consideration of alternative policies all of which are only incrementally different from 
the status quo” (Lindblom, (1979, p. 517).  Disjointed analysis can be conceptualized through 
a “mutually supporting set of simplifying and focusing stratagems” (Ibid) which includes 
incremental analysis as well as: 
a. limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives; 
b. an intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the 
empirical aspects of the problem; 
c. a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than 
positive goals to be sought; 
d. a sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials; 
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e. analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible 
consequences of a considered alternative; 
f. fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in 
policy making (Ibid). 
The third type of analysis conceptualized by (Lindblom, 1979, p. 517) is strategic 
analysis which can be defined as “analysis limited to any calculated or thoughtfully chosen set 
of stratagems to simplify complex policy problems, that is, to short-cut the conventionally 
comprehensive ‘scientific’ analysis”.  Other authors have also studied this concept from 
different angles.  Boushey (2010) conceptualizes a concept inspired by incrementalism as 
policy reinvention.  This is a phenomenon where governments instead of carrying out a holistic 
solution for each public policy problem, they copy solutions from ideological peers, 
neighboring states and regional programs (Ibid).  This is a tool for decreasing uncertainty 
concerning the results of a new public policy (Ibid).   
An incremental decision-making model is utilized by governments in order to learn and 
replicate public policies in the social and economic sector (Ibid).  These types of policy 
reinvention are modified over time, through an incrementalist approach (Ibid).  Nevertheless, 
numerous governments have struggled with replicating policies with little amendments in order 
for these to be adapted to their countries, which later may cause more harm than good (Ibid).  
However, an incremental learning model does have benefits in the process of policymaking 
because States are more prone to replicate policy successes rather than policy failures (Ibid).  
Under the lens of path dependence theory, policymakers tend to choose certain policies “which 
most closely resembles existing practice or previous choices” (Kirk et al, 2007, p. 252).  The 
cost of new policies and the costs of obtaining new information to carry out such policy hinders 
policymakers into carrying out radical change (Ibid).  Hence, policymakers may carry out new 
policies, yet in an incremental manner, because institutions tend to be conservative and 
restrictive towards change (Ibid).     
 2.3.3 Predictions of the role of the policymaker in different theories 
After the overview of the general theoretical framework of the role of the policymaker   within 
different schools of thought, certain predictions can be established.  Observing table 3, two 
predictions have been established, regarding the role of the policymaker.       
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Table 3: Predictions regarding the structure of different theories 
Predictions Rational Decision Making Approach 
Historical Institutionalism  
Approach 
Role of the 
policymaker 
The policymaker, as change 
agents (Weick and Quinn, 
1999), are involved in episodic 
change. 
The policymaker, as change agents 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999), are 
involved in continuous change. 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Mahoney, 2000; Parsons, 1995; Weick 
and Quinn, 1999) 
Role of the policymaker in Rational Decision Making Approach:  the role of the policymaker 
can be associated with rational decision making approach, if such policymakers, in the role of 
the change agents, are involved in episodic change (Weick and Quinn, 1995).    
Role of the policymaker in Historical Institutionalism Approach:  the role of the policymaker 
can be associated with the historical institutionalism approach, if such policymakers, in the role 
of the change agents, are involved in continuous change.  
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Chapter 3: Methodological Section 
In this chapter, there will be a presentation and an analysis of the methodology utilized in this 
thesis.   
3.1 Design 
This research is a non-experimental, deductive, qualitative case study. The unit of analysis is 
an organization because the thesis studies a public policy designed, implemented and evaluated 
by the State of Chile (Babbie, 2013).  This thesis is a case study because its main intention is to 
study intensively a single unit, a single public policy, the Transantiago, through the theoretical 
lens of two paradigms in order to observe which theory fits better (Gerring, 2004).  The goal is 
to study the implementation case of the Transantiago intensely and not extensively studying 
different public transportation policies for example in Latin America (Sartori, 1970). It is also 
a cross-sectional study because it studies a specific moment in time, three years after the initial 
implementation, between the years 2007 to 2010, as it can be observed in model 3.  The 
selection of years can be justified as well: the policy was first implemented by Bachelet’s 
administration on the year 2007.  Second, the policy is still in operation.  Thus, due to the vast 
amount of information and the research time frame, it was decided in order to efficiently study 
the implementation failure, to study the first three years from its implementation in order to 
observe if the policy could recover from policy failure.  
Model 3: Timeline of study 
 
Model created by researcher 
The purpose of this research is to explain a social process, such as the implementation 
of a Chilean public transportation policy.  This research searches to go beyond exploring and 
describing an implementation process, therefore it has the aim of explaining the process of 
implementation and its effects.  Specifically, applying idiographic explanation, which is an 
approach to explain idiosyncratic causes of a specific event or condition (Babbie, 2013).   
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According to Blatter and Haverland (2012), a defining characteristic of a case study is the 
diverse and vast amount of empirical observations.    
To respond the thesis questions, there will be a collection of diverse data from primary 
and secondary sources (Babbie, 2013). By primary sources, this refers to governmental 
documents such as the proposal of the PTUS from the Chilean Congress´ Library (MOPTT, 
2000) as well as official documents published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development as well as from the Inter-American Development Bank. Some of these 
sources are available online, some are only accessible at the Chilean Library of Congress in 
Valparaiso while some are of confidential nature.  By secondary sources, this refers to the 
academic literature that shall be studied (from EBSCO, JSTOR, Leiden University’s library 
catalogue and Google Scholar).   Furthermore, there will be a utilization of newspaper articles 
from Chilean newspapers such as El Mercurio and La Tercera.    
It must be stated that the evolution of the recollection of sources evolved as the thesis 
progressed.  State documents were preferred over journalistic articles because the documents 
published by the State had much more detailed information regarding the fulfillment of 
objectives.  There was a geographical obstacle regarding the issue of obtaining data.  The 
proposal of the PTUS can only be accessed in the Chilean Library Congress in Valparaiso.  This 
source is not online.  Due to the fact that the thesis is carried out in the Netherlands, not in 
Chile, this document was obtained through Sebastian Ureta, who wrote a book about the 
subject.  Some data, such as the accident statistics, which are of confidential nature, could only 
be obtained through appealing to the Transparency law, law number 20.285.   Some statistics 
were not accessible, even by appealing to this law, hence the statistics published by Andrés 
Gomez-Lobo (the actual Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications) were utilized 
as well.  
 Furthermore, there was a preference of sources associated with Bachelet’s 
administration rather than Piñera’s administration because this thesis studies the first three years 
of implementation of the Transantiago (2007 to 2010).  Bachelet was in office since March 
2006 until March 2010, later on Piñera was president until the year 2014.  Therefore, the sources 
studied were predominantly related to Bachelet’s administration rather than Piñera’s.  
Analogously, the memoire of René Cortázar (former Secretary of Transportation and 
Telecommunication during Bachelet´s administration), where he narrates the experience of 
amending the Transantiago, was very useful in order to respond part of this thesis sub-questions.  
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Likewise, it must be also stated that Sergio Espejo (another former Secretary of Transportation 
and Telecommunication during Bachelet´s administration who was present during the ‘Big 
Bang’) as well as Felipe Morandé (former Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunication 
during Piñera’s administration) did not write a memoire about the Transantiago.  If they had, it 
would have been incorporated in the analysis of data.   
Table 4: Sources utilized to respond the sub-questions  
Table created by researcher. 
As it can be observed in table 4, different types of sources were utilized in order to 
respond each sub-question.  To respond the first sub-question, ‘to what extent was the 
Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?’, numerous types of sources will be 
utilized.  These are: documents from international organizations, Chilean governmental 
Sources 
 
To what extent was 
the Transantiago a 
policy failure or a 
policy success in 
2007?’ 
How did the policy 
implementation 
continue after the 
initial failure? 
To what extent was 
the Transantiago a 
policy failure or 
policy success in 
2010? 
Chilean official 
governmental 
documents 
X X X 
Documents 
from 
International 
Organizations 
X X X 
Chilean 
presidents' 
speeches 
 X  
Chilean 
journalistic 
articles 
X X X 
Academic 
Literature X X X 
Interviews 
published in the 
media 
 X  
 30 
documents, Chilean journalistic articles and academic literature.  For responding the second 
sub-question, ‘how did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure?’ there will 
be the utilization of several sources.  These include: Chilean presidents' speeches, interviews 
published in the media; documents from international organizations, Chilean governmental 
documents, Chilean journalistic articles and academic literature.  To respond the third sub-
question, ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or policy success in 2010?’ there 
will be the utilization of the following sources: documents from international organizations, 
Chilean governmental documents, Chilean journalistic articles and academic literature.   
3.2 Methodology  
What is analysis? According to Abbot, analysis ¨means the assembly, examination, and 
interpretation of the materials you have gathered to answer your research question¨ (2014: 169). 
Analysis means “preprocessing your various kinds of data so they can synthesize into the 
written text that speaks to your empirical and theoretical puzzles” (Ibid).  To respond the thesis 
question: how did the policy implementation process of the Transantiago continue after the 
initial policy failure and how can its effects be explained? there will be the utilization of 
document analysis and the application of the Congruence Analysis approach (CON).   
Document analysis is preferred over the process of carrying out interviews due to 
several reasons.  It is a convenience sampling due to the utilization of ‘natural occurring 
materials’ that can be utilized directly without having to go through the haggles of interviewing 
government officers with very occupied schedules or obtaining the consent to utilize the 
recordings of interviews or documents (Rapley, 2007; Flick, 2014).  Therefore, facilitating the 
task of obtaining the data, nevertheless, problems may arise in finding these sources.  
Yet, when they have been successfully obtained, the analysis process can be carried out 
deftly.   Second, as Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori (2011) states, most of social life in modern society 
has been transcribed in different types of written texts, therefore carrying out a thesis nowadays 
through the utilization of available public documents is a feasible task.   Through the analysis 
of Blatter and Haverland (2012: 99), this case has been clearly justified in the first chapter and 
considered carefully.  This case has accessible information in order to establish convincing 
causal claims and the case was selected in order to respond specific goals, such as studying a 
social phenomenon, investigating the effects of incrementalism on a public policy, among other 
goals (Ibid).   
 31 
  To carry out the case study, CON approach was preferred over other types of 
approaches.  The CON approach is not grounded on comparing cases or searching for co-
variation or correlation between variables (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).  The prime condition 
for analyzing the data obtained is through verifying if the observations obtained can exemplify 
the theories, paradigms or concepts being studied in an accurate manner (Ibid).    CON is a 
“small-N research design in which the researcher uses case studies to provide empirical 
evidence for the explanatory relevance or relative strength of one theoretical approach in 
comparison to other theoretical approaches” (Ibid, p. 144).  
  This is carried out by deducing series of explicit propositions and recognizable 
implications from abstract theories and comparing them with a large collection of empirical 
reflections (Ibid). An elevated degree of congruence between the observed evidence and the 
deduced implications from theory ‘A” is later compared with the degree of congruence between 
the observed evidence and the deduced implications from theory ‘B’ (Ibid).  The main goal of 
this exercise is “to discover which theory provides a better explanation in comparison to other 
theories as well to which theory can provide relevant explanatory insights that the other theories 
have not yet provided” (Ibid, p. 145).  This approach is also known as a ‘three-cornered fight’ 
because the empirical observations are compared with the theoretical expectations from two 
different theories: historical institutionalism and rational decision-making. 
  To carry out a CON approach it is important to identify if the case is a crucial case, a 
least-likely case or a most-likely case.  A crucial case has abstract characteristics that can be 
utilized to test a theory (Eckstein, 1992).   According to Eckstein (1992, p. 157), a crucial case 
“must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, 
must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed”.  In a crucial case it must be 
extremely challenging to reject any observations contrary to theory as deviant (Ibid).   Gerring 
(2007, p. 232) states that a case is crucial when “it can be explained precisely by a theory; no 
other theory can explain the facts of that case, and the theory is invariant (deterministic)”.    
Gerring narrates that “a most-likely case is one that, on all dimensions except the 
dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted to achieve a certain outcome and yet does not. It 
is therefore disconfirmatory. A least-likely case is one that, on all dimensions except the 
dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome and yet does so. 
It is confirmatory” (Ibid).    Therefore, the assumption is that the Transantiago is a crucial case 
which has a high degree of correlation with the paradigm of Rational Decision-Making 
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(Eckstein, 1992; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Gerring, 2007).  It will also be observed as a 
‘most-likely’ case or a ‘least-likely’ case if the Transantiago can to a certain degree explain the 
expectations from the paradigm deduced from rational decision-making or historical 
institutionalism. 
   There is one main reason for utilizing the CON approach in this thesis.  Presently, there 
there are theoretical disputes and gaps in the literature of public policies regarding which 
paradigm can explain more holistically and to a greater extent a public policy.  There can be 
assumed expectations that “divergent theories lead to contradictory implications in the 
empirical world, that theories stand in stark opposition to each other, and that the goal is to 
identify the best or most important theory” (Ibid, p. 145).  Additionally, there are “theories lead 
to complementary implications in the real world and that a plurality of theories is not a source 
of confusion and uncertainty but rather provides the basis not only for more comprehensive 
explanations but also for conceptual and practical innovations” (Ibid).   Thus, by studying two 
paradigms and the number of relevant observations that are congruent with the expectations of 
each theory, then differentiated in order to establish which paradigm is more relevant and 
adequate for comprehending the Transantiago or if these overlap.      
3.3 Techniques of study  
The specific techniques of the CON approach can be narrowed in four main concepts:  
propositions, hypotheses, predictions and expectations.  Blatter and Haverland (2012: 160) 
define propositions as “the constitutive concepts and formulate the causal connections to define 
and characterize a paradigm or theory. Paradigms are usually characterized by a broad set of 
constitutive propositions and without a clear specification of causal connections. Theories, in 
contrast, are usually specified with the help of a small set of constitutive propositions including 
causal propositions”.  The propositions utilized in this thesis is the paradigms of rational 
decision-making and historical institutionalism.  
 Hypotheses are a subcategory of propositions because they identify “the expected causal 
connections between the constitutive concepts of a theory” (Ibid). These connections act as 
mechanisms of necessary and sufficient causal conditions that leads to particular results (Ibid).  
Predictions are “the concrete observations that we can expect in the empirical world. The term 
predictions should be reserved for those expectations that are on the same level of abstraction 
as the empirical observations” (Ibid).   According to Haverland and Blatter (2012), 
expectations is an umbrella concept because it includes all predictions and propositions that can 
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be derived from theories and paradigms.   Therefore, in this thesis, the expectations include the 
paradigms of rational decision-making and historical institutionalism as well as the predictions 
that can be deduced from those paradigms, which can be observed in table 5.  
Table 5: Paradigms, predictions and expectations 
Predictions Rational Decision-Making Approach Historical Institutionalism  Approach 
Structure 
The structure of the Transantiago as 
a public policy matches Parsons’ 
(1995) policy cycle theory. 
The structure of the Transantiago as a 
public policy follows Mahoney’s 
(2000) path dependency theory. 
Role of the 
policymaker 
The policymaker, as change agent 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999) is 
involved in continuous change. 
The policymaker, as change agent 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999) is involved 
in episodic change. 
         Table created by the researcher. 
  3.3.1 Conceptualizations and operationalizations in order to respond the first and 
third sub-question 
First, it is needed to conceptualize and operationalize what is policy success and policy failure.  
The use of these terms are utilized in order to address the ‘effects’ that are specified in the 
central research question: “how did the policy implementation process of the Transantiago 
continue after the initial policy failure, and how can its effects be explained?”  Policies can be 
considered partly successful when it has achieved its objectives and the role of a policymaker 
is influenced by the support of civil society in relation to such policy (McConnell, 2015).     
Conceptualization of policy success: when a public policy reaches its proposed goals and 
attracts no criticism from civil society (McConnell, 2015).   
Operationalization of policy success: when the Transantiago reaches its proposed goals and 
attracts no or little criticism from civil society.  By no criticism or little criticism, this refers to 
more than 50% of approval in a citizen poll towards the Transantiago.   
Conceptualization of policy failure: When a public policy does not reach its proposed goals and 
attracts criticism from civil society (McConnell, 2015). 
 34 
Operationalization of policy failure When the Transantiago does not reach its proposed goals 
and attracts considerable criticism from civil society.  By considerable criticism, this refers to 
more than 50% of disapproval in a citizen poll towards the Transantiago.     
  Thus, in this thesis it will studied the completion of a policy’s objective from historical 
institutionalism approach and rational decision making approach.  This will aid in establishing 
if the policy’s objectives were fulfilled.  Later on, it will be presented in the section of the role 
of the policymaker, statistics of approval of the policy.  Therefore, this will permit to respond 
the second sub-question regarding how did the policy implementation continue after its initial 
failure and if after three years it continued being a policy failure.   
 There are two main documents that shall be utilized in this thesis in order to establish 
the Transantiago’s initial objectives. The first document, is the ‘original’ document where the 
public transportation policy was first proposed.  This document, “Plan de Transporte Urbano 
de Santiago 2000-2010” (known also as ‘PTUS’), written on the year 2000, written by President 
Lagos’ assessors.  It was the official first proposal of what would later be known as 
Transantiago.  now, was later rebranded as ‘Transantiago’.   This document can only be 
accessed from the Chilean Library of Congress in Valparaiso and it is not available easily.   
 Nevertheless, the researcher obtained a scanned version from the author Sebastian 
Ureta, who have written several articles and a book about the subject.  The second document is 
called “Comisión Investigadora del Transantiago: Conclusiones” (Investigating Commission 
of Transantiago: Conclusions) published in December 2007.  This document was written by 
members of the Chilean Congress, who published this manuscript in order to assign 
responsibilities about the failed policy.  This document is available online. PTUS had 
established one general objective, five specific objectives, seven programs in order to tackle 
these propositions in order to to ‘fix’ public transportation in Santiago.  The main general 
objective of PTUS was to contribute to a better quality of life for the inhabitants of Santiago.   
More precisely, in this document (MOPTT, 2000, p. 17), it establishes that the general objective 
of the policy is to:  
Contribute to a better quality of life of its inhabitants to the extended level of the 
city as well as those neighborhoods or residential sectors.  The quality of life in 
the context of a ‘Transportation Plan’ should be understood under the ample 
concept which includes from the necessity of travelling and the extension of those 
trips up to the way these are carried out.  A city where the need to move from and 
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the extension of obligatory journeys is reduced, where the mobility of people is 
accomplished in secure and comfortable conditions, with a tariff structure of 
agreement with efficient costs, as well as with low or no negative effects towards 
the environment, implies attributes that links quality of life in the city with quality 
of the urban and transportation system.  Living in a neighborhood where it is 
possible to walk, to move by bicycle, without the risks of suffering accidents, 
where the noise level is low, also represent attributes to like quality which one 
should aspire to.3  
 
PTUS proposed five specific objectives, which can be observed in table 6. 
Table 6: The five specific objectives of PTUS 
                                                
3 Free translation by researcher 
Specific 
objectives Operationalization of objectives  
Efficient use 
of resources 
Investments that have to maximize social profitability 
Efficient conditions in the regulation 
Implementation of rules and competition between transportation 
operators 
An efficient management and regulation of routes and terminals 
infrastructure that generates an efficient use of resources. 
Efficient 
Quality of 
services 
The quality of the buses (such as the height of the steps, the interior of 
the vehicles for public transportation, the ability of the driver to drive 
smoothly among others) 
A positive relationship (‘niceness’) between the bus drivers and the 
users. 
The quality of the transportation from different aspects: entries, bus stops, 
type of pavement and esthetics in general. 
Promotion of 
social equity 
Social groups and groups from different geographical locations must 
benefit from the access to transportation. 
The design of the transportation must be balanced with the designs of the 
rest of the vehicles from the private sector.  
Environmental  
sustainability 
Reduction of the negative impacts of transportation on the environment 
(noise and sound pollution and esthetic effects)  
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Table created by 
the researcher 
utilizing additional 
information (MOPTT, 2000)  
The document ‘Comisión Investigadora del Transantiago: Conclusiones’ (Investigating 
Commission of Transantiago: Conclusions) established the several objectives for the 
Transantiago: 
1.  “Maintain and eventually increase the participation of public transport in 
the modal partition. 
2. To make operative a system’s network   
3. Reduce the average length of trips   
4. Stimulate and facilitate non-motorized trips   
5. Diminish the contribution of public transport to the atmospheric 
contamination   
6. Improve the security of the transportation system 
7. Modernize the institutional sector at a metropolitan level4 (Hales et al, 
2007, p. 9) 
 
As it can be observed, the main objective and five specific objectives from PTUS 
overlap with those seven specific objectives identified by the Chilean Congress.  There are other 
issues studied in PTUS, in their seven programs on establishing the Transantiago, which are not 
mentioned in the second document because they involve topics such as regulation of urban 
transport, of urban freight, regulation of other private services of transport of people (such as 
school buses and tourism buses) or the modernization of street lamps.  Since the main subject 
of investigation which is the subject of public transportation per se in Santiago, this thesis won’t 
study the seven programs proposed by PTUS.  It must be acknowledged that the original 
document of PTUS had very high goals objectives because on the year 2000, policymakers 
firmly believed that by the year 2010, Chile would be a developed country. Thus, as it can be 
spotted in table 7, the five original objectives have been matched with the seven objectives 
proposed by the investigative commission. Utilizing the implementation requirements rather 
than its proposed seven programs in the operationalization of the case has permitted to observe 
                                                
4 Free translation by researcher. 
Security for 
people and 
goods 
Security during all the stages of a user’s journey: from walking to the 
vehicle of public transportation, waiting for it and during the journey as 
well.   
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the real requirements needed for observing if the policy has succeeded or not regarding its 
objectives.  
 Furthermore, to measure the specific indicators of PTUS, some additional clarification 
is needed.  The indicator of “Citizens Participation” was not mentioned in the initial objectives 
of the PTUS in the document written by the members of the Chilean congress, yet it was later 
mentioned several times during the length of the document.  Since it was also one of the 
requirements established by PTUS in order to have a successful policy, it was deemed 
acceptable to include in within the indicators.  Regarding the objective of efficient use of 
resources, specifically what was required by PTUS in order for the policy’s success was citizen 
participation through the creation and establishment of a ‘citizen inspector’.  According to 
MOPTT (2000, p.103) there is a necessity for the citizen to: 
 Assume a role of observation and vigilance of the proper functioning of the 
set of the urban transportation system, as well as citizen inspection regarding 
the accomplishment of diverse norms associated to quality of service by the 
concessionary businesses, collaborating actively with the authorities.5  
Policymakers knew that “since there are not enough resources from the State to cover 
all the journeys, citizens will be needed to inspect, observe.  These would be young volunteers, 
who have the legal capacities and have been duly trained to fulfill such tasks”6 (Ibid).  The 
objectives from the Investigative Committee state seven other similar yet not identical specific 
objectives of the public policy.  It must be noted that they do not document their interpretation 
of how to operationalize these objectives.  Therefore, a combination of the specific objectives 
proposed by PTUS with the objectives from the Investigative Committee was established in 
order to analyze in depth which were Transantiago’s initial objectives.  This fusion of objectives 
can be observed in table 7. 
It must be informed to the reader that the indicator of ‘efficient quality of services’ 
which had the aim of reducing the average length of trips cannot be studied in this thesis 
because the information available is incomplete.  The only think tank who studied this 
indicator, did not carried out continuous studies.  Hence, it only carried out a study of average 
length of trips in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 but not on 2009 nor 2010.  They only continued 
                                                
5 Free translation by researcher. 
6 Free translation by researcher. 
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their study in 2011.  Since this thesis studies the first three years after the implementation of 
the Transantiago (2008, 2009 and 2010), utilizing such indicator would not bring the insight 
necessary for understanding the policy process.  Furthermore, it is not a crucial indicator 
because there are four other indicators that provide a holistic view of the policy itself.   As a 
consequence, only four official indicators of the Transantiago will be studied in this thesis.    
Table 7: Official objectives of the Transantiago as well as their conceptualization and 
operationalization  
Specific 
objectives 
(PTUS) 
Objectives from the 
Investigative 
Committee 
Conceptualization Operationalization 
Efficient use 
of resources 
Citizens 
Participation 
Establishment of a 
'citizen inspector' 
Observe if there has been the 
establishment of such 'citizen 
inspector' 
Citizens respect the 
norms needed to 
implement policy 
Evaluate and compare 
evasion between the years 
2006 with the years 2007 to 
2010 
Institutional 
modernization at a 
metropolitan level 
Creation of 
Metropolitan 
Authority of Urban 
Transport 
An institution that has 
political as well as 
administrative power, 
created by supreme decree or 
from article 43, law number 
18.575 
Creation of a Coordination 
Committee of Public 
Transportation that 
represents different sectors 
Reformulation of the 
Administrative Counsel 
Funds 
Policy efficiency Establishment of budget 
The maximum subsidy by 
the State towards public 
transportation in Santiago 
cannot overpass  US two 
billion dollars. 
Efficient 
Quality of 
services 
Reduction in the 
average length of 
commutes 
Obtain data that 
shows that citizen's 
commutes have been 
reduced since the 
implementation of 
the Transantiago 
Comparison of length of 
time of commutes  from the 
years 2006 with the years 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
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Promotion of 
social equity 
Maintain and 
increase the use of 
metropolitan public 
transport 
Encourage citizens to 
prefer the use of 
buses and the 
subway rather than 
the utilizations of 
cars or motorcycles 
Comparison of utilization of 
public transport in Santiago 
from the years 2006 with the 
years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010 
Environmental  
sustainability 
Reduce public 
transportation´s 
contribution to the 
atmospheric 
contamination 
Compare the air 
quality in Santiago 
with the year 2006 
with the years 2007 
to 2010 
Comparison between the 
number of days of  
'emergency', 'pre-
emergency', 'environmental-
alert' between the years 2006 
to 2010 
Security for 
people and 
goods 
Improve the 
security of public 
transportation 
Reduction of street 
accidents caused by 
buses 
Compare the amount of 
metropolitan bus associated 
accidents between the years 
2006 with 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010. 
Table created by researcher with information from other sources (Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT, 
2000) 
Concerning the objective of environmental sustainability, there will be a comparison of 
numbers of 'emergency', 'pre-emergency', 'environmental-alert' between the years 2006 to 2010.  
These are indicators to measure the quality of air, specifically the amount of ‘particulate matter’.  
This quality of the air and its association with the amount of particulate in the atmosphere can 
be observed in table 8.  Particulate matter are different particles that are suspended in the air 
(MMA, 2016b).   They may be a mixture of solid, liquid or liquid and solid particles and these 
differ in composition, origin and size (Ibid).  Researchers are interested in the breathable 
particulate matter, which penetrate the respiratory system, provoking irritations and can worsen 
different diseases as well (Ibid).   
Table 8:  Indicator of quality of air, associated with the amount of particulate  
Quality of Air Particulate's indicator 
Good 0-99 
Regular 100-199 
Environmental Alert 200-299 
Pre-Emergency 300-499 
Emergency Over 500 
Table created by researcher (MMA, 2016) 
 Thus, for clarification reasons, only these four objectives will be searched: 
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1.  Efficient use of resources. 
2.  Promotion of social equity. 
3. Environmental sustainability. 
4. Security for people and goods. 
3.4 Conceptualization and operationalization in order to respond the second sub-question 
In order to respond the second sub-question of this thesis, there will be a throughout analysis 
of two predictions, structure and role of the policymaker, under the lens of rational decision 
making approach and historical institutionalism approach.   
  3.4.1 Conceptualization and operationalization to measure the prediction of 
‘structure’:  
 3.3.1.1 Structure from the rational decision making approach 
From the rational decision making approach, there will be a utilization of Parsons’ model in 
order to identify the final two steps in his diagram: the implementation of the Transantiago and 
the evaluation of the Transantiago. 
Observing model 3, it can be identified that the Transantiago’s case following Parsons’ diagram 
would be established in the following order:   
1. There is an identification of a problem. 
2. Definition of Santiago’s transportation as a problem. 
3. There is an identification of alternative responses/solutions. 
4. There is an evaluation of the options available. 
5. The selection of PTUS (which would later be renamed as the 
Transantiago)  
6. Implementation of the Transantiago 
7. Evaluation of the Transantiago  
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Model 4: Parsons’ policy cycle adapted to the Transantiago’s case 
  
Model based on Parsons’s diagram (1995, p. 77) 
 As a consequence, in this thesis, there will be a search for identifying the final two steps 
in Parson’s policy cycle: step 6 (the implementation of the Transantiago) and step 7 (the 
evaluation of the Transantiago). 
 3.3.1.2 Structure from the historical institutional approach 
From the historical institutionalism approach, the structure of the Transantiago as a public 
policy follows Mahoney’s (2000) path dependency theory, which includes also the concept of 
critical juncture. 
Path Dependence: There are six specific path dependence properties defined by Mahoney and 
Schensul (2006, p. 457). 
1.  “The past affects the future” (Ibid):  past actions affect the development 
of future actions.  When the Transantiago was implemented, it also needed 
to change incrementally, taking into consideration its past: such as the 
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transportation culture, the behavior of citizens, among other factors.  A 
policy is not implemented in a vacuum.  
2. “Initial conditions are causally important” (Ibid): the critical juncture of 
February 10th, 2007 as well as the reaction of the people from the capital 
towards the new policy affected its efficiency and how people adapted to 
the change of policy.   
3. “Contingent events are causally important” (Ibid).   Contingency relates to 
the random, unpredictable relationship between the beginning of the policy 
to the final outcome (Ibid).  According to the experts, there was a high 
probability of having an unsuccessful policy while as for the government, 
they thought that the experts’ point of view was only a probability (Hales 
et al, 2007.)   No one from the government imagined the final outcome 
(Ibid).  
4. “Historical lock-in” (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457).  The policy is 
forced to follow a certain path and gets narrower over time.   
5. “A self-reproducing sequence occurs” (Ibid): a “given outcome is stably 
reinforced over time” (Ibid, p. 465).   
6. “The occurrence of a reactive sequence” (Ibid): the past events related to 
the transportation in Santiago along with the Transantiago itself as a policy 
are both a “reaction to earlier occurrences and a cause of subsequent 
occurrences” (Ibid, p. 467).   
 
Critical Juncture: Mahoney (2000, p. 513) defines critical junctures as “the adoption of a 
particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives.  These junctures are 
critical because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to 
return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”. Before a critical 
juncture, there are numerous outcomes possibilities, while as after the critical juncture, the 
range of events becomes considerably narrowed (Mahoney, 2001).     There will be a search to 
identify: 
1.  If there were more than one options before the Transantiago was selected 
as a policy option. 
2. If the implementation of the Transantiago did not permit returning to the 
initial point. 
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3. After the implementation of the Transantiago, the range of possible 
solutions became narrower. 
 
  3.3.2 Conceptualization and operationalization to measure the prediction of ‘role 
of the policymaker’   
3.3.2.1 Role of the policymaker under the lens of rational decision making approach 
Observing table 9, it can be seen how under the lens of the rational decision making approach, 
it will be studied how policymakers used ‘episodic’ change during the initial years after the 
implementation of the Transantiago (Weick and Quinn, 1999).   
Table 9: Role of the policymaker under the lens of the rational decision making approach 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Weick and Quinn, 1999) 
 The policymaker involved in ‘episodic change’ in the main responsible of carrying out 
changes within the policy.  It will be analyzed if Transantiago’s policymakers communicate 
differently after the implementation of the Transantiago, if they reinterpret revolutionary 
triggers differently and if they build commitment and coordination (Weick and Quinn, 1999). 
3.3.2.2 Role of the policymaker under the lens of historical institutionalism approach 
Under the lens of the historical institutionalism approach, it will be studied how policymakers 
used ‘continuous’ change during the initial years after the implementation of the Transantiago 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999).   As a consequence, based on table 10, there will be search to observe 
the prime role of the policymaker as the one who is redirecting change rather than being the 
prime responsible of establishing. 
 
Conceptualization Operationalization 
Communication of alternative schema 
The alternative schema will be observed when 
policymakers communicate about new, 
dramatic, intentional and planned change. 
Reinterpretation of revolutionary 
triggers 
Policymakers reinterpret the errors and faults 
of the Transantiago 
Build commitment and coordination 
Policymakers will try to seek leverage with 
different civil and political actors in order to 
remedy the policy 
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Table 10: Role of the policymaker under the lens of historical institutionalism approach 
Conceptualization Operationalization 
Recognizes and reframes current 
patterns 
Policymaker recognizes errors of the 
Transantiago and tries to reframe the 
Transantiago 
Carries out intentional change at the 
margin of the policy 
Carries out Lindblom's (1959) incrementalist 
change: trial, error and repeat. 
Policymakers will utilize mechanisms 
such as learning, improvisation and 
translation 
Policymakers carry out learning, improvisation 
and translation through incremental 
mechanisms (Lindblom, 1959) 
Utilizes new language, thus altering 
the identity of the policy 
Policymaker will utilize new language to alter 
perception of the Transantiago as a policy 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Lindblom, 
1959)  
3.4 Validity and reliability of the data collected 
The data collected will contribute in different ways to the thesis. The documents obtained will 
serve as Flick (2014) says for different purposes such as representing the essential data on which 
the analysis and conclusions are delivered, as the foundation of interpretations as well as the 
main medium to present and communicate findings. The data will contribute in reliability 
because it will be systemic and be studied under two different paradigms, different angles, thus 
there will be a systematic study of the implementation of the Transantiago.    
 According to Babbie (2013, p.191), validity refers to “the extent to which an empirical 
measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration”. Thus, in this 
thesis, only relevant information that can answer the thesis’ question will be utilized and 
analyzed to generate conclusions. Furthermore, it will be taken into consideration the bias 
obtained from primary documents due to their political origins.   In those cases, a different 
document with a different political origin will be utilized as well in order to respond in an 
unbiased way.   Also, there is an increased validity by utilizing two types paradigms instead of 
one in order to explain the implementation process of the Transantiago.  Researchers who study 
only one paradigm under the CON approach run the risk of selecting only empirical 
observations that confirms their theory (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).   
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Through the utilization of two paradigms, there is a smaller probability that empirical 
information about the implementation process of the Transantiago that disconfirm the paradigm 
of historical institutionalism or rational decision-making would not be sidelined (Ibid).  Also 
those same observations that do not explain both paradigms would not be neglected (Ibid).     
Blatter and Haverland (2012) state that there is an increased validity of an academic finding 
through the confirmation of more than one theory because it is more convincing and shows that 
there are other alternatives.  If the study strongly disconfirms a theory through the CON 
approach, the contribution to the academic literature increases if another theory is displayed 
(Ibid).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
Chapter 4: Transantiago’s implementation: between its Big Bang until 2007 
In this chapter, it will be analyzed Transantiago’s implementation between its Big Bang until 
the end of the year 2007.  The first sub-question in this thesis is ‘to what extent was the 
Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?’  In order to respond this question, it 
will be analyzed if Transantiago’s initial implementation was a success or a failure.  Thus, it 
will be studied in this section to what extent the Transantiago was a policy failure or a policy 
success by the end of the year 2007.  Following the thesis’ conceptualization and 
operationalization of policy success and failure, it will be analyzed up to what extent 
Transantiago’s initial objectives were accomplished by the year 2007 and the approval rate of 
civil society towards the Transantiago.   
 
4.1 Fulfillment of objectives by the year 2007 
To carry out such analysis, it will be studied up to what extent the four official objectives of the 
PTUS were accomplished by the end of the year 2007.  These four official objectives were 
efficient use of resources, promote more social equity, environmental sustainability and security 
for people and goods.  
 
4.1.1. Efficient use of resources:   
This section of efficient use of resources is segmented into three parts: citizens’ participation, 
institutional modernization at a metropolitan level and policy efficiency.   
 
4.1.1.1 Citizen Participation 
To measure ‘citizen participation’, there were two main indicators: observing if there was an 
establishment of a 'citizen inspector' and if citizens were respecting the norms needed in order 
to implement the policy.   
Studying the first indicator, the establishment of a citizen inspector’, it can be 
established that by the end of the year 2000, this indicator was not fulfilled.  As it was stated in 
the same document of PTUS, political analysts knew that there were not enough funds from the 
government to finance inspectors (MOPTT, 2000).  On the year 2006 to 2007, citizens were not 
offered an active role regarding the inspection of good behavior of transportation users 
(Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014).  Only after the Big Bang, bus operators started hiring staff who 
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could observe and inspect if users were paying the bus tariffs (Cortázar, 2015).  Later on, police 
officers were incorporated in the scheme due to the lack of force that these hired staff had (Ibid).      
 The second indicator, if citizens were respecting the norms needed in order to implement 
the policy, was measured by observing if citizens were paying their transportation tariffs.  One 
of Bachelet’s administration main concerns regarding the Transantiago was the high evasion 
rate.  Academics are unsure about the concrete reason of why people were avoiding paying the 
tariffs: it could be a cultural phenomenon, citizens’ reaction to the service, due to the increase 
in bus fares or by a “contagion effect of the unethical behavior where potential fare evaders 
learn by observing others” (Guarda et al, 2015, p. 56).  It all started when the former system 
was replaced by the Transantiago.  In the previous informal transportation system, there were 
hundreds of micro-entrepreneurs, who drove their own buses and their salaries was based on 
the fares collected (Ureta, 2014; Guarda et al, 2015).     
Thus, evasion was never measured because there was never evasion in the former public 
transportation system (Ureta, 2014).  Bus drivers would make sure that passengers pay the fee 
or they would not be allowed to enter the bus.  These fees were all charged in cash (Ibid).  While 
as in the new system, the Transantiago, buses became “operated by large companies overseen 
by a government authority with drivers paid a set wage and having much better working 
conditions” (Ibid).   When the Transantiago was implemented, many paradigms shift occurred: 
bus drivers were no longer the owner of their buses, passengers had to pay differently their 
tariffs and bus drivers had stable salaries. 
The transformation in Santiago’s public buses administration was very notable: from 
the hundreds of micro-entrepreneurs it shrunk into “15 areas of business operated by one 
independent company each, centrally managed by an independent entity” (Ureta, 2014, p.  
374).  There was also a change in paradigm regarding to how citizens paid: from cash to a 
contactless card called BIP card (Ibid).   Policymakers foresaw that the competition for 
passengers would stop or decrease, which would increase the safety on the streets (Ibid). It is 
important to note that the fare evasion has been carried out on buses and not on the subway, 
the fare evasion in the Chilean subway is almost nonexistent (Ibid).  Nevertheless, 
policymakers did not foresee that bus drivers would stop charging the bus fees (Cortázar, 2015; 
Mardones, 2008; Hales et al, 2007).  The relationship between incentives and tariff evasion is 
a relationship that is frequently mentioned throughout articles, news and books.  Authors state 
that less monetary incentives for bus drivers, equals higher tariff evasion (Ureta, 2014; Ureta; 
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2015; Hales et al, 2007; among many other authors).   Cortázar stated that the Transantiago did 
not function initially as planned because there was a lack of incentives for bus drivers 
(“Cortázar culpó”, 2008, October 6). 
The percentage of evasion of public buses by the year 2007 was 13,4% (Valencia, 
2011).  There are no records of evasion for the year 2006 (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014).  This 
is due to the main reason that in 2006 there was still the former transportation system where 
bus drivers were in charge of controlling the evasion.  Bus drivers’ salaries came directly from 
the tickets they would sell, thus academics believe that there was very little to no evasion 
(Ureta, 2014; Guarda et al, 2015).  
As a summary of this section, it can be concluded that citizen participation in the initial 
year of implementation of the Transantiago was not fulfilled.  In the indicator ‘citizen 
inspector’, this was not created.  Regarding the indicator ‘citizens’ respect towards norms’, this 
was not present due to the high amount of tariff evasion (13,4%) (Valencia, 2011).   
 
4.1.1.2 Creation of a Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transport 
In order to establish if there is an efficient use of resources, it is needed a strong institution that 
has the institutional capacities and strengths to organize and maintain the well function of a 
public good such as public transportation.  There are three ways to study this indicator: 
observing if such institutions uphold administrative power, if there is a creation of a 
Coordination Committee of Public Transportation and if there has been a reformulation 
regarding the Administrative Counsel Funds.   
The first indicator studied was observing if an institution was created which could 
uphold administrative power.  According to PTUS, for the policy to work, it needs an institution 
with the force of laws or decrees (MOPTT, 2000).  Therefore, the Metropolitan Authority of 
Urban Transportation in order to work as it is stipulated to do so in theory, in practice it needed 
political power.  This enables the institution to establish orders and tackle issues, which without 
it becomes only a decorative institution.  Thus, it can obtain this political power through two 
routes: a) through a supreme decree established by the President and Congress or b) it should 
have its power from article 43, law number 18.575 (MOPTT, 2000).  This law is called ‘Ley 
Orgánica Constitucional de Bases Generales de la Administración del Estado, in other words, 
the ‘Organic Constitutional Law of General Bases for the Administration of the State’ (MOPTT, 
2000).    According to the Chilean Library of Congress (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
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Chile, 2000), article 43 enunciates the conditions for how an institution can delegate its power 
to another institution:  
The exercise of attributions and own faculties can be delegated, on the 
following conditions: 
a) The delegation must be partial and fall on specific matters; 
b) The delegates must be officials from the dependency of the delegating; 
c) The act of delegating shall be published or notified as corresponds; 
d) The responsibility for the administrative decisions that shall be 
adopted or for performances that shall be executed will befall on the 
delegate, without prejudice for the responsibility of the delegated due 
to negligence in its obligations of leadership or inspecting, and  
e) The delegation shall be essentially revocable.  The delegate can not 
exert its delegated competency without previously revoking the 
delegation.  It can, equally, delegate the faculty of signing, by order 
of the delegating authority, in determined acts regarding specific 
issues.  This delegation does not modify the responsibility of the 
corresponding authority, without prejudice which could affect the 
delegate due to negligence in its exercise of the delegated 
authorization.7  
 
Therefore, this article applied to the case of the Transantiago would refer that the new 
metropolitan institution would have power of its own, having its own law to justify it or from 
the Ministry of Transportation.  Hence, it was searched in the online Chilean library of Congress 
for the presence of law 18.575 with an association with the ‘Transantiago’ or if the 
‘Transantiago’ had been given a law on its own to be able to tackle issues.  Thus, seven months 
after the Big Bang, the law 20.223 was promulgated on October 18th, 2007.  This law states that 
the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications: 
  Can designate a provisional administrator for the concessionaires that have 
been expired, between natural persons who are registered in the public 
record of provisional administrators which shall be carried out by such 
Ministry.  The administrator will have the necessary powers to ensure 
                                                
7 Free Translation by the researcher 
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compliance with the concession contract and, especially, those 
corresponding to the ordinary course of the enterprise whose concession has 
been expired, that the law and status indicate that the directory or who does 
his substitute and manager. The Provisional Administrator will respond 
even to the slight fault in the exercise of its functions.  Without prejudice to 
ordinary negligence in the exercise of their functions. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the person to whom has an expired concession due to the causes 
already established in the tender basis, will be disqualified to present again 
by himself or through an intermediary, whether natural or legal, in the 
bidding process for the concession expired8 (Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2007).   
 
 Consequently, by the year 2007, a law was created that enables an administrator to 
foresee the fulfillment of activities of the policy.   
 
The second indicator to fulfill the objective of the creation of a Metropolitan Authority 
of Urban Transport was to observe if Coordination Committee of Public Transportation was 
created by the year 2007.  On April 7th, 2003, President Lagos wrote a presidential cabinet 
memo number ‘001’ with the title “presidential instructive that creates committee of ministers 
for urban transport for the city of Santiago”9 (Presidencia de la República, 2003).  In that memo, 
he states that the committee that would oversee the proper functioning of the PTUS would be 
presided by the Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications and the Minister of Public 
Works (Ibid).  The vice presidents of the committee would be the Ministers of Housing and 
Urban Planning and Minister of Public Goods (Ibid).  The permanent guests according to the 
memo is the Sub-Secretary of Transportation, the Metropolitan Regional Governor, the 
Executive Director of CONAMA, the General Coordinator of Concessions of the Ministry of 
Public Works, the Executive Secretary of SECTRA and the President of the Directory of the 
Subway (Ibid).   
In the original manuscript of PTUS it stated that the committee should have three main 
participants in other to represent the different sectors of the metropolitan public transportation 
in Chile.   The committee had to be integrated by public institutions, transportation operators 
                                                
8 Free Translation by the researcher. 
9 Free Translation by the researcher. 
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and civil society (MOPTT, 2000). Nevertheless, this committee by the end of the year 2007 
only had representatives from public institutions and not from transportation operators and civil 
society.  Hence, by the year 2007, the creation of the committee was fulfilled but to a certain 
extent due to the absence of the proposed heterogeneous committee. As a conclusion, the 
Committee has not fulfilled PTUS’ objective of having an inclusive committee to discuss and 
compare solutions for issues associated with the Transantiago.   
 The last indicator is to observe if the ‘Administrative Counsel Funds’ or ‘Fondo de 
Mejora de Locomoción Colectiva´ was reformulated (MOPTT, 2000).   This fund is an 
institution that was created in 1975, during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, based on DFL 
391 (decreto con fuerza de ley; decree with force of law).  The fund is established by a 
commission from different representatives of urban transportation and the Ministry of 
Transportation and Telecommunications (MOPTT, 2000).  PTUS proposed that this committee 
had to be decentralized, bestowing its authority from the Ministry of Transportation and 
Telecommunications to an exclusive metropolitan transportation authority.    By the end of the 
year 2007, there was not a reformulation of the funds.   
As a summary of this section, it can be concluded that in the year 2007, the creation of 
a metropolitan authority of urban transport’ was fulfilled to a certain extent.  There was a 
creation of the coordination committee of public transportation but it did not have the 
heterogeneous committee that the policy proposed in its design.   The establishment of a 
metropolitan transportation authority was fulfilled because by the year 2007, a law was created 
that enables an administrator to foresee the fulfilment of activities of the policy.  The third 
indicator, reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds was not fulfilled.   
 
4.1.1.3 Policy Efficiency  
This indicator is studied by analyzing if there has been respect towards the budget by the end 
of the year 2007.  The State decided that the subsidy from the State to finance the Transantiago 
between the years 2000 to 2010 could not surpass US $2 billion dollars (MOPTT, 2000).   In 
other words, the policy established that the State could not spend annually more than US $200 
million dollars.   Thus, to be specific regarding this indicator, on the year 2007, the Chilean 
State could not spend more than US $200 million dollars on the Transantiago.  This figure was 
obtained from the official PTUS official manuscript. The following fragment states:   
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With the objective to deliver figures, even when they are of a very 
preliminary character and based on intermediary assumptions, it has been 
estimated a fiscal budgetary requirement for the period 2000-2010 in a 
figure approximate to US $2 billion dollars, which would signify an 
increase between 20 to 30% of the budgetary frame for Santiago’s public 
transportation in the last years10 (MOPTT, 2000, p. 107). 
Contrary to what many politicians said to the press (Cortázar, 2015), the Transantiago 
from its design was planned to never be a self-sufficient policy (MOPTT, 2000).   Cortázar 
(2015) blamed the Transantiago’s fiscal deficit on its policy design.  He argued that in its 
design, a permanent subsidy from the State should have been included in the blueprints.  Little 
did he know that a permanent public subsidy was included in the initial design, establishing 
that it should have a permanent subsidy from the Administrative Counsel Fund (MOPTT, 
2000).  Furthermore, this subsidy had to be adjusted, in other words, it would need more 
resources in order to deliver a more efficient public transportation to citizens (Ibid).  The 
second fragment narrates the obligation of the Chilean State to finance the Transantiago:   
The State, on its part, will have to also invest, considering that the yearly 
average of such investment should be something superior to the average that 
has been annually been invested in the sector in the past six years (which has 
been around US $140 millions).  It exists, in this sense, a direct relationship 
between the amount of resources that is incorporated to the system and the 
better or worse quality of public transportation services that is possible to offer  
the social benefits are of great magnitude, by improving the quality of the 
journeys, increasing in a considerable manner the efficiency of the system, 
more efficient use of vehicles and roads, by diminishing the levels of 
congestions as well as the negative impacts on the environment and improving 
the conditions of safety in the trips11 (MOPTT, 2000, p.  9). 
After the Big Bang, the Transantiago had a deficit that kept on increasing. The exact 
numbers of the deficit are very hard to obtain because the State had not published them, the 
press and the academic sphere have stated different figures as well.  In this thesis, it will be 
                                                
10 Free translation by researcher. 
11 Free translation by researcher.  
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used Andrés Gómez-Lobo’s statistics.  He is the actual Secretary of Transportations and 
Telecommunications in Bachelet’s second term, had the access to this information and was 
able to publish the statistics in his paper.   Through the data he obtained from the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, the deficit of the 
Transantiago by the year 2007 was US $371,5 million dollars (Gómez-Lobo, 2012, p. 35).   
René Cortázar, Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications had another point of 
view.  He said that after the Big Bang, the normalization of the Transantiago had a high cost 
for the State, specifically an investment of US $500 million dollars (Cortázar, 2015).  The 
implementation of the policy caused a political crisis and in order to normalize the situation, 
the government could not increase the tariffs for users (Ibid).     
Table 11: Loans solicited by the State to finance the Transantiago  
Institution Year US dollars (millions) 
The World Bank 2005 4,8 
The World Bank 2005 30 
International Development Bank 2007 35,4 
Banco Estado 2007 160 
Total 230,2 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Cortázar, 2015; World Bank, 2005; 
World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2010; Molina et al, 2008) 
It is important to highlight that the Transantiago was not only financed through the arcs 
of the Chilean State.   The Chilean government had asked for international and national loans 
to finance the construction of infrastructure of the Transantiago as well as its maintenance 
(Cortázar, 2015; World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2010; 
Molina et al, 2008).  Observing table 11, by the year 2007, the Chilean State had solicited 
several loans which had a total of $ US 230,2 million dollars.  Academics have stated numerous 
reasons for the initial financial deficit of the Transantiago, there are three main causes that 
academics agree upon: the change of tariff, the lack of functioning of the ‘Bip!’ card after the 
Big Bang and and the massive tariff evasion (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014; Gómez-Lobo, 2012; 
among many others).  
First, once a standard transportation tariff was established for the utilization of both 
subway and buses, this meant a lower recollection of revenue (since ticket subways were 
historically more expensive) (Cortázar, 2015).  Second, the lack of functioning of the ‘Bip!’ 
card during the first week of Transantiago’s implementation caused a loss (Ibid).  Third, the 
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financial deficit became aggravated due to citizens’ tariff evasion.  As a summary of this 
section, it can be concluded that in the year 2007, the policy efficiency of the Transantiago was 
blatantly inefficient.  The establishment of the budget, first forecast by policymaker s in the 
year 2000, was not respected by policymakers in the year 2007, causing a grave State deficit.  
As a conclusion of the analysis of the objective efficient use of resources, it can be 
established that by the end of the year 2007: policy efficiency was not achieved, citizen 
participation was not fulfilled and only the creation of a metropolitan authority of urban 
transportation was fulfilled to a certain extent.  Therefore, the goal of efficient use of resources 
by the year 2007 was not fulfilled to completion.   
4.1.2 Promotion of Social Equity 
In this section, it will be studied if the policy has encouraged citizens to prefer the use of buses 
and the subway rather than the utilizations of cars, have citizen transportation prefers remained 
the same or have changed in a different manner. 
Table 12: Number of millions of people using the metropolitan subway between 2006 and 2007   
Years 2006 2007 
Amount of people using the subway (millions) 331 601 
Table created from Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano (2015, p. 8) 
Table 13: Total amount of cars in the Metropolitan Region between 2006 and 2007 
Years 2006 2007 
Total number of private cars 1018261 1091947 
Table based on the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 
Chile, 2007; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2008) 
The government has a lack of statistics for the year 2007 regarding the use of the public 
buses, hence it will be studied how many people utilized the metropolitan subway.   In table 12, 
it can be observed that the amount of people using the subway has doubled since the 
implementation of the policy, increasing the demand by 81,6%.  In table 13, it can be observed 
that between the years 2006 and 2007, the amount of cars in the Metropolitan Region increased 
7,2%.  Gallego, Salas and Montero (2013) state that there is a direct relationship between the 
increase of amount of cars and the implementation of the Transantiago.  The increase of amount 
of cars in the capital is due to the reason that commutes are now longer (Ibid).  The policy has 
promoted social equity because there has been an increase in the use of the metropolitan 
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subway, nevertheless, the quality of the service has motivated people to prefer private vehicles.    
It can be observed that by the year 2007, the amount of passengers increased by 81,6% 
(Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano, 2015).  However, the amount of cars in the 
Santiago increased by 7,2%.  Therefore, this indicator was not completed by the year 2007. 
4.1.3 Environmental Sustainability 
According to numerous academics, Santiago is one of the most contaminated cities in the world 
(Awe, Y. et al, 2015; Garcia-Chevesich et al, 2014).  Santiago is a city located in a valley, 
surrounded by the Andes Mountains and the Chilean Coastal Range, provoking no adequate air 
drainage (Garcia-Chevesich P, et al, 2014).  Furthermore, “Santiago has thermal inversions 
during winter months (April-August) that make atmospheric conditions highly vulnerable, 
preventing polluting particles in the air to be dispersed” (Ibid, p. 202).  They state: 
Particles in the air disperse or decrease significantly only when precipitation 
occurs or fronts bring in relatively clear cold air masses, temporally improving air 
quality. However, this situation continues for a couple of days and air pollution 
then comes back to pre-rain levels, or even worse. When such phenomena reach 
critical levels necessitating environmental alerts, pre-emergencies, or 
emergencies, hospitals often become overloaded with the in- crease of respiratory 
problems among the local population (Ibid). 
  As a consequence, one of the most important goals of the Transantiago was improving 
air quality for citizens by reducing the negative contribution of public transportation towards 
the hemisphere.  Policymakers had the firm belief that utilizing newer technologies and 
different types of gasoline would reduce the contamination impact of the Transantiago (PTUS, 
2000; Córtazar, 2015).   
Table 14: Number of days with ‘emergency’, ‘pre-emergency’ and ‘environmental alert’ 
between the years 2006 and 2007 
 Emergency Pre-Emergency Environmental Alert 
2006 0 3 21 
2007 0 4 27 
Table based on statistics from Health SEREMI (SEREMI Salud RM, 2016) 
As it can be observed from table 14, there have been no ‘emergency’ alerts and if 
compared between 2006 with 2007, an increase of one pre-emergency alert and six more 
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environmental alerts.  This can be read through the lens that the Transantiago had a negative 
effect in the environment.  Nevertheless, academics who specifically work in the area of 
environmental public policies have stated repeatedly that it is difficult to identify the effect of 
the Transantiago on Santiago’s air quality because other phenomena also affect the general air 
quality of the capital, not only public transportation (Figueroa et al, 2013).   
Furthermore, since Santiago is located in a valley with deficient air circulation, it is 
incorrect to blame public transportation for the air pollution rather than geographical factors.  
There are many other negative sources such as enterprises that pollute, private cars that use 
diesel, houses that utilize wood instead of gas for indoor heating purposes and “la niña” weather 
patterns (it provokes the dry season in Chile, thus reducing the frequencies of rain to clean the 
air).   However, a specific contingent event could explain the increase of ‘environmental alert’ 
and ‘pre-emergency’ days on the year 2007.   During 2007, the economic relationship between 
Argentina and Chile became constrained.  As a result, Argentina stop exporting natural gas to 
Chile, forcing the Chilean industrial sector to substitute natural gas to petroleum (Figueroa et 
al, 2013).  Consequently, air pollution increased in spite of Transantiago’s new bus fleets and 
utilization of cleaner energy sources (Ibid).   
It can be observed that by the year 2007, the air contamination in Santiago increased.  
Analysts could state that this could be associated with the Transantiago.  Hence, the 
Transantiago did not fulfil its goal of reducing air contamination by the year 2007.  However, 
this interpretation of results is not conclusive. Air pollution in Santiago could have increased, 
not due to the Transantiago but due to the Chilean industrial sector, which was forced to utilize 
more fossil fuels due to a constrained economical relationship with Argentina. 
4.1.4 Security for people and goods 
The reduction of accidents was of primary concern for policymakers when designing the 
proposal for the policy on the year 2000.  In the previous transportation system, bus drivers 
had no stable earnings and had to compete with other bus drivers for each passenger.  This was 
known as ‘bus racing’ and buses ran over red lights buses yet a fact of life for citizens residing 
in Santiago (Ureta, 2014; Mardones, 2008).  Since bus drivers drove so hazardously, passenger 
accidents were high.  PTUS had the goal to “stop seeing users as merely bodies to transport 
from one place to another in the city (similar to freight), but had to see them as consumers, or 
clients, who demand ‘quality services’” (Ureta, 2015, p. 34).  Therefore, policymakers 
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predicted that by eliminating the need for chasing customers out of the equation, there would 
be a reduction in the number of passenger accidents (Ureta, 2014; PTUS, 2000).   
It is important to state that the Metropolitan SEREMI of Transportation do not have 
statistics regarding the number of accidents in metropolitan subways.    It must be informed 
that the following statistics regarding the number of severity of accidents caused by buses, is 
considered as classified and of restricted divulgation by the Chilean Sub-Secretary of 
Transportation.  Hence, through the authorization by the Chilean Ministry of Transportation 
and Telecommunications, the following data has been processed.  Any type of distribution or 
copy of this information without the authorization of the Chilean government is constituted as 
a felony. 
Table 15: Number of accidents involving buses in Santiago between the years 2006 to 2007 
Year 2006 2007 
Number of accidents involving a bus  in Santiago 4951 3406 
     Table replicated from Gómez-Lobo (2012, p. 8) 
Analyzing table 15, it can already be observed that there has been a reduction of 31,2% 
associated with accidents involving a bus in Santiago between 2006 and 2007. These statistics 
were obtained from Andrés Gómez-Lobo, a famous Chilean politician.  The researcher tried to 
contact CONASET and they refused to bestow this information.  Therefore, this information is 
classified and is very difficult to access. In his report, Gómez-Lobo states that his sources are 
the local police (Carabineros de Chile) and CONASET.   
Table 16: Number of passengers deceased, seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured 
in inter urban buses between the years 2006 and 2010 
Years Deceased Seriously Injured 
Medium 
Injured 
Mildly 
injured Total 
2006 3 136 128 1579 1846 
2007 2 136 110 1255 1503 
Table created by researcher based on statistics given by Chilean Ministry of Transportation 
and Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016)  
The statistics from table 16 are from the National Security Commission of Transit 
(Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, personal communication, July 
13, 2016).  It can be highlighted that the number of deceased, medium injured, and mildly 
injured passengers decrease between 2006 to 2007.  The number of seriously injured 
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passengers are the same.  It is notable to observe the decrease of 14% of medium injured 
passengers and 20,5% mildly injured passengers between the years 2006 to 2007.  This is a 
direct consequence of the elimination of the micreros’ cartel and the establishment of the 
Transantiago, the security for passengers increased.  As a conclusion, it can be observed that 
by the year 2007, the security for of passengers increased dramatically from the year 2006 to 
2007 (Gómez-Lobo; 2012; Carabineros de Chile, 2016).  Therefore, this indicator was 
completed by the year 2007. 
4.1.5 Summary of fulfilled objectives by 2007 
As it can be observed in table 17, several objectives were fulfilled while some were not.   The 
efficient use of resources, the promotion of social equity and environmental sustainability were 
not fulfilled.  The indicator security of people and goods was fulfilled.  
 
Table 17: Summary of objectives fulfilled by the year 2007  
Specific 
objectives 
(PTUS) 
Conceptualization of the objectives from the Investigative 
Committee 
Fulfilled 
by the 
year 
2007 
Efficient use of 
resources 
Citizens 
Participation 
Establishment of a 'citizen inspector' No 
Citizens respect the norms needed to 
implement policy No 
Institutional 
modernization 
at a 
metropolitan 
level 
Creation of 
Metropolitan 
Authority of 
Urban 
Transport 
Establishment of a 
metropolitan 
transportation authority 
Yes 
Creation of a 
Coordination Committee 
of Public Transportation 
Yes 
Reformulation of the 
Administrative Counsel 
Funds 
No 
Policy 
efficiency 
Respect towards the pre-established 
budget No 
Promotion of 
social equity 
Maintain and increase the use of metropolitan public 
transport Yes 
Environmental  
sustainability 
Reduce public transportation´s contribution to the 
atmospheric contamination No 
Security for 
people and goods Improve the security of public transportation Yes 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT 2000) 
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4.2. Approval rate of civil society towards the Transantiago in the year 2007 
It can be observed from table 18 that the average of approval of the Transantiago since its 
implementation until December 2007 was 12,62%.  The range of approval was between 9% to 
15,3%.  The highest approval was on March while the lowest was on December.  while as the 
lowest was in August.  On December 2007, 91% of Chileans did not approve how Michelle 
Bachelet and her administration were managing the Transantiago. It must be highlighted that 
there is no statistic available for the month of February 2007. 
 
Table 18: Citizen Poll between March 2007 to December 2007: Do you approve the way 
Michelle Bachelet and her administration is managing the “Transantiago”?  
Months Percentage (%) 
March 2007 15,3 
April 2007 14,4 
May 2007 13 
June 2007 13,3 
July 2007 15,5 
August 2007 14,5 
September 2007 10,2 
October 2007 10,9 
November 2007 10,1 
December 2007 9 
Table created by researcher with statistics from Adimark (2007)  
4.3 Chapter Summary: Transantiago’s implementation: between its Big Bang until 2007 
It can be observed that the Transantiago was a policy failure by the end of 2007, not only due 
to the lack of approval from civil society but also, due to the lack of completion of its official 
objectives. 
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Chapter 5: Theoretical analysis of Transantiago’s structure and policymakers 
 
In this second section, it will be analyzed Transantiago’s implementation after its Big Bang. 
The second sub-question in this thesis is how did the policy implementation continue after the 
initial failure?  In order to respond this question, it will be analyzed if Transantiago’s structure 
through the lens of historical institutionalism and rational decision making approach in the 
structure of the policy and the role of the policymakers.   
 
5.1 Structure of policies 
5.1.1 Structure under the rational decision making approach 
In this section, in will be analyzed the structure of the Transantiago as a public policy from the 
lens of rational decision making approach. Remembering that the structure under the rational 
decision making approach would study only the last two steps of Parsons’ (1999, p. 77) 
diagram: the implementation of the Transantiago and the evaluation of the Transantiago. 
Utilizing Parsons’s model (1999), the Transantiago is implemented on February 10th, 
2007.   The Transantiago was supposed to be implemented on October 22nd, 2005, but due to 
the lack of infrastructure and buses, the implementation date was moved to February 10th, 2007.  
The change of dates had the advantage that during February is the Chilean summer holidays 
where the demand for public transportation is at its lowest level thus according to policymakers 
would be susceptible to less problems during its implementation (Ibid).  
The evaluation of the policy was catastrophic by policymakers, international and 
national media, civil society and politicians (Mardones, 2008; Olavarría, 2013; Figueroa and 
Orellana,2007; Hales et al, 2007; Ureta; 2014, among many other authors who agree on the 
failure of the implementation of the Transantiago).  According to Cortázar (2015), 
Transantiago became more than a failed policy, it became a social crisis and a political crisis 
that lasted over a year because it gave great responsibility towards the government and the 
political coalition Concertación.  Nevertheless, before a full evaluation that was carried out by 
the Senate and the Congress of Chile on December 2007 (Hales et al, 2007; Allende et al, 
2007), the government was already establishing which was the new problem in the 
metropolitan transportation.  The following story line can be observed in model 5. 
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Model 5: Parsons’ model applied to the Transantiago  
 
Table created by researcher, utilizing different sources (Parsons, 1995) 
As it can be observed in model 5, Transantiago as a public policy cannot be associated 
under Parsons’ policy cycle.  When Cortázar was appointed as Secretary of Transportation and 
Telecommunications on March 27th 2007, he skipped the evaluation process, the observation 
of a problem and the identification of a problem.  He immediately worked on a new alternative 
solution.  He then skips the evaluation of options and the selection of a policy option and 
implements directly the application of incrementalist fixes on April 2007.  It must be observed 
that the evaluation phase of the implementation of the Transantiago was only fulfilled on 
December 2007.  Therefore, Cortázar’s incremental changes were carried out before the final 
evaluation from the Chilean Congress and the Chilean Senate.  Therefore, Parsons’ model was 
not respected nor followed.   
Cortázar and his team had to carry out an incrementalist posture after the the Big Bang 
because Bachelet wanted to salvage the policy and ‘normalize’ the metropolitan public 
transportation in Santiago (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2015).   Cortázar became the government’s 
soldier in shining armor when he was chosen to be Secretary of Transportation and 
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Telecommunications because as soon as he took his office, gradual changes started to occur 
(Ureta, 2014).  As Ureta (2014, p. 375) narrates “this normalization was aimed not only at 
repairing a series of massive failing technical devices but also at the performance of ‘normal’ 
subjects”.  As Ureta (2014) and Cortázar (2015) highlights, Cortázar’s protagonism took main 
stage while he “fixed” the Transantiago through quantitative standards: reshuffling routes, 
extending night bus routes, changing contracts, bringing larger bus fleets, increasing number 
of bus stop shelters and implementing new technology.   By the end of Bachelet’s presidential 
term, the 4,000 buses in 2007 incremented to 6, 400; created 2,700 additional bus stops, 
increased the 222 established routes to more than 350 and strengthened the subway system 
(Ureta, 2015; Cortázar, 2015).   
One of the features of the policy was the built infrastructure, a lane of segregated 
corridors to separate buses from cars: the goal was to have 225 kilometers in order for the 
policy to function according to plan (Cortázar, 2015; PTUS, 2000; Allende et al, 2007; Hales 
et al 2007).  Nevertheless, as observed in table 19, only 11 exclusive bus lanes were available 
during the debut of the Transantiago.  After Cortázar’s involvement in normalizing the policy, 
almost half of the proposed bus lanes were constructed by the end of Bachelet’s term.   
Table 19: Amount of exclusive bus lanes available between the years 2006 and 2010 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bus lanes (km) 11 77 101.1 101.1 
Table based on additional information (Gómez-Lobo, 2012, p.  36) 
Additionally, Cortázar strived to discipline and seek negotiation with all the actors 
involved in order to normalize the Transantiago. Essentially, he was able to institute the 
‘Metropolitan Authority of Transportation’ and a ‘Provisional Administrator’ as well as 
directing political actors to efficiently fulfil their tasks associated with the policy (Ibid).  For 
instance, he strengthened political alliances with international organizations such as the IDB 
and the World Bank (Ibid).   However, there were several detractors in his intent of establishing 
alliances such as the with opposition and even think tanks such as Libertad y Desarrollo, who 
would not support the new law due to ‘conflict of interests’ (Ibid).   
He condemned those actors who did not cooperate in his incremental plan (Cortázar, 
2015). He chastised the presidents of all the banks who were involved in the AFP and stated 
how they were directly responsible for the failure of the Transantiago: that their inefficiency 
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regarding the lack of buses, roads and infrastructure had aggravated the political crisis in Chile.  
(Ibid).  The Secretary warned them about the sanctions that would be applied if there were not 
any drastic changes in the quality of services in a short period of time (Ibid). 
5.1.2 Structure under the historical institutionalism approach 
In this section, in will be studied the structure of the Transantiago as a public policy from the 
lens of historical institutionalism approach. The structure of a policy under the historical 
institutionalism approach is based on two concepts: path dependency theory and critical 
juncture.  
 
5.1.2.1 Path Dependence Theory 
Mahoney and Schensul’s first indicator “the past affects the future” (2006: 457) is 
clearly illustrated in the Chilean case of metropolitan public transportation. Chilean 
governments, for many years, have struggled with public transportation for its capital residents.  
For instance, Chile’s political administration affected the way public transportation was 
administered in Santiago.  During Pinochet’s dictatorship, he privatized the public 
transportation, liberating it to the market (Ureta, 2014; Ureta, 2015; Cortázar 2015).  On 
October 5th, 1988, citizens of Chile participated in a plebiscite in order to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 
the permanence of General Pinochet, in his self given title of ‘President’, to remain eight more 
years in power: the result was that the ‘no’ won (NDI, 1989).  As a consequence, Patricio 
Aylwin was elected in 1989 and Chile officially returned to democracy in 1990.  Keeping in 
mind that Aylwin’s administration faced the struggle to consolidate the transition towards 
democracy, his administration also had the task to regulate and create new laws towards 
Santiago’s ‘liberated public transportation’ (Ureta, 2014).   
Second, the former ‘past’ of president Ricardo Lagos, who designed the Transantiago, 
had a direct relationship regarding to its implementation. Ricardo Lagos, when he was the 
Secretary of Public Works during Aylwin’s administration, had already a clear target, to create 
a grand legacy during his ‘future’ presidency conceptualized as Transantiago (Ureta, 2015).  
He said, during his post on April 16th, 1996: “my priorities are, first, to improve the public 
transportation, create exclusive roads for buses12” (Quijada et al, 2007, p. 11).  When he was 
President, he wanted launch ten colossal infrastructural projects in several cities throughout 
                                                
12 Free translation by researcher  
 64 
Chile’s bicentennial as an independent country (Ureta, 2015).   
However, his only obstacle was the effects of 1997’s Asian Crisis on the Chilean 
economy (Ibid).  As a consequence, his hopes of constructing bicentennial memorials vanished 
because there were not enough resources in the Chilean’s arcs to finances them (Ureta, 2015).   
Yet, his hopes returned when he heard from his advisors about PTUS, which was a policy that 
could theoretically be carried out without investing significant part of the Chilean budget (Ibid).   
He started campaigning for PTUS, which would solve a metropolitan social problem, produce 
growth with equity and would eliminate the micreros’ cartel (Ureta, 2015, Allende et al, 2007).  
He wanted to rush the implementation and inaugurate it before the end of his term (March 
2006) to mark his administration’s legacy (Ureta, 2015).  Many think tanks and policymakers 
were not heard when they advised Lagos and his advisers about postponing the policy (Hales 
et al, 2007; Mardones, 2008; Allende et al, 2007). 
The second indicator, “initial conditions are causally important” (Mahoney and 
Schensul, 2006, p. 457) can be seen on the implementation day of the Transantiago, known as 
the Big Bang of February 10th, 2007, considered also as a critical juncture.  by the existing 
literature affected drastically Santiago’s residents.   The transportation from one day to another 
ceased to be efficient (Allende et al, 2007).   According to famous senator Isabel Allende, the 
routes created by policymakers were illogical and inefficient because they did not consider 
routes close to hospitals, subzones or job markets, did not have the minimum conditions for 
the system to work efficiently and primarily did not incorporate the urban culture of taking 
only one form of transportation in order to reach from point A to B (Ibid).    Thus, the Big Bang 
provoked a slow, uncomfortable and uncertain public transportation in Santiago (Ibid).    
The third indicator, “contingent events are causally important” refers to how spurious, 
unpredictable events can have a profound effect in a final policy outcome (Mahoney and 
Schensul, 2006, p. 457).   There were several contingent events in the first three years of the 
implementation of the policy.  First, there was the Big Bang, which was foreshadowed by 
experts, stating that there was a high probability of having an unsuccessful policy while as for 
the government, they thought that the experts’ point of view was only a probability (Hales et 
al, 2007). Chilean politicians never imagined that the policy would fail because the advisers 
promised them a successful policy (Ibid).  However, they had theoretically proposed the policy, 
pressured by Lagos’ advisers in creating the most economical policy that would not utilize too 
many resources from the state, thus they gambled the success of the policy by hoping that all 
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actors would coordinate as planned and if no errors occurred, leaving no space for mistakes 
(Hales et al, 2007; Allende et al; 2007; Gómez-Lobo, 2012; Quijada et al, 2007; Gallego et al, 
2013).      
On July 2007, a confidential report was published by the press, narrating how the 
president of the Chilean subway (Bas Tomic) foreshadowed that the Transantiago would cause 
a financial, social and political crisis (Mardones, 2008).  Some analysts state that the political 
upheaval and spontaneous riots from civil society had not been seen since the return of 
democracy in 1990 (Mardones, 2008; Olavarría, 2013; Gómez-Lobo, 2012; ““Bachelet 
sustituye a cuatro ministros”, 2007, March 27).   According to Cortázar (2015, p. 14), it was 
likely that the policy was going to have serious problems: 
 Ii seemed impossible that it could be applied an integral reform of the public 
transport system in a city of more than five million people, implementing new 
technology, changing all the routes immediately, without producing an 
important disarray.  (…) The question was not if there would be problems.  The 
doubt is what would be the magnitude of those.  And, certainly, they exceeded 
the imagined13. 
 The second contingent event was the opposition in Congress regarding the approval 
of the IDB credit and the law to permanently subsidize the Transantiago (Hales et al, 2007; 
Cortázar, 2015).  Bachelet’s team had planned that the Transantiago could be solvent through 
the loan from Banco Estado, afterwards when that loan was fully utilized, then the 
administration would employ the IDB loan until the Congress could agree on a permanent law 
to subsidize the Transantiago.  For Bachelet’s surprise, the opposition carried out a fierce 
refusal towards the IDB credit, questioning its legality and towards the establishment of a 
permanent public transportation subsidy for the Metropolitan Region (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 
2015; Ureta, 2015; Hales et al, 2007).  As a consequence, the Transantiago was unstable 
financially and the government was forced to utilize the constitutional 2% of the budget, which 
is only utilized during catastrophic events (Cortázar, 2015).  The opposition was fierce 
regarding forbidding the validation of the IDB credit as well the bestowment of a permanent 
subsidy due to political reasons (Ibid).  For the Chilean opposition, Bachelet’s administration 
decision of utilizing the constitutional 2% for financing the Transantiago, meant a political 
                                                
13 Free translation by the researcher 
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victory (Ibid).  Through the lens of the opposition, Bachelet had recognized that the 
Transantiago was a ‘catastrophe’ (Ibid).   
The third contingent event, was the earthquake of 2010.  The earthquake of February 
27th, 2010 was 8.8 in the scale of Richter, is Chile’s second strongest earthquake and one of 
the top ten fiercest earthquakes worldwide (Contreras and Winckler, 2013).  Unfortunately, 
this occurred during Bachelet’s last days in power, leaving the reconstruction of public 
institutions to the next administration.  Sebastian Piñera took oath in March 2010 and his 
administration had to confront the aftermath of the earthquake, thus, the reconstruction of the 
south of Chile.   His government estimated that the catastrophe would cost the State US $30 
billion dollars: US $9 billion dollars in goods and services (that were stopped being produced 
due to the earthquake) and US $21 billion dollars in public and private infrastructure (Lefin, 
2011, February 20).  Hence, the government made a fiscal reform, increasing taxes to tobacco, 
enterprises, among others, in order to finance the reconstruction (Ibid).   
The earthquake brought certain consequences to the Chilean policymaking sphere.  
First, it meant that the Transantiago was no longer an immediate priority for the government 
on 2010.   Second, according to Alfred Joignant (professor at Diego Portales University and 
currently a Counsellor in the Chilean Electoral Service), the magnitude of the earthquake 
provoked symptoms of anesthesia in Chilean politics (“El fúturo de Bachelet", March 2).  This 
can be observed when Piñera recommended an increase of Transantiago´s subsidy in the 
proposal of the annual Chilean fiscal budget for the year 2011 and it had little to no 
discrepancy from the Opposition (Cortázar, 2015).   Therefore, policymakers were able to take 
advantage of the catastrophic earthquake in order to increase funds for the Transantiago. 
The fourth contingent event was the Argentinean lock down of natural gas supplies to 
Chile between 2007 to 2009 which as a direct consequence, negatively affected the air quality 
of Santiago (Figueroa et al, 2013).  This provoked that the Chilean industrial sector to substitute 
natural gas to petroleum, which as a consequence increased the air of pollution in Santiago, in 
spite of the new fleet of the Transantiago (Ibid).  Therefore, it was very difficult for 
policymakers to state to the press and to civil society about the ecological advantages of the 
new transportation system. Chile´s dependency on Argentinean natural gas stopped when the 
regasification plant of natural liquefied gas in Quintero started operating and the industrial 
sector commenced again to utilize this energy source, instead of petroleum (Ibid).  This meant 
that only after 2010, the benefits of the Transantiago were discerned by policymakers. 
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The fifth contingent event was the creation of law 20.285, also known as Law of 
Transparency.  The State lacked the resources to finance a ‘citizen inspector’ nevertheless the 
creation of this law established that “every person has the right to request and receive 
information from any organ of the Administration of the State”14 (Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2016a).  A citizen can request this information electronically, by sending 
an email to the institution or using the Transparency website or physically by mail or by going 
to a OIRS (Office for Information, Claims and Suggestions; Oficina de Informaciones, 
Reclamos y Sugerencias) (Consejo de Transparencia, 2016).  These OIRS were established in 
every public institution, including one for the Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano 
(Directory of Metropolitan Public Transportation). The participation of citizens in inspecting 
or giving their opinions regarding the Transantiago was more of a byproduct of law 20.285 
rather than a byproduct of the implementation of the Transantiago. 
The fifth indicator to identify path dependence theory in the Transantiago case is 
“historical lock-in” (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457). This can be observed when 
Transantiago’s faulty design issues were discovered after its implementation.  The 
Transantiago was already implemented and millions of people already using this public good, 
thus, it was too late to change the policy (Cortázar, 2015).  Therefore, as a policymaker, 
Cortázar and his team had to learn from the errors, fix issues, restructure the system but it was 
unthinkable to return to other previous system (Ibid).  Literally, the policy was locked in, he 
stated how there was no other alternative than to move forward and continue operating the 
Transantiago (Ibid). 
The sixth and final indicator, “a self-reproducing sequence occurs” (Mahoney and 
Schensul, 2006, p. 457) can be observed in numerous ways.  The Transantiago is a self-
reproducing sequence because it is already, as previously stated, in a historical lock-in.  This 
means that the Transantiago as a policy can only be modified, not changed (Mahoney, 2000).  
Hence, if there is a new public transportation policy in Santiago, it won’t be a new radically 
public policy, it will be a policy based on the learnings of the previous policy and with minor, 
cosmetic changes (Ibid). 
 
 
                                                
14 Free translation by researcher. 
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5.1.2.2 Critical Juncture 
The first indicator of critical juncture is observing if there were more than one option before 
the Transantiago was selected as a final policy option.  Policymakers had several options in 
order to handle the issue of Santiago’s public transportation.  First, they could do nothing at 
all. Before the return of Chilean democracy in 1990, the dictator Augusto Pinochet privatized 
public transportation, thus, liberating it to the market (Ureta, 2014; Ureta, 2015; Cortázar 
2015). After the return to democracy in 1990, the administration struggled to regulate the 
metropolitan public transportation due to the government’s difficult relationship between bus 
drivers (Ureta, 2015).  According to Ramon Acevedo, a consultant hired by the State, bus 
drivers were very difficult to handle (Ibid).  When dealing with the bus drivers, Acevedo knew 
that the bus drivers’ requests if not fulfilled would end in threats (Ibid).  Bus drivers, known as 
micreros, were organized cartels, who were “largely successfully resisted substantive 
regulation of the sector during the 1990s, especially through the use of strikes that paralyzed 
the city almost completely”15 (Ibid, p.  24).  
The old transportation system in Santiago fulfilled its main purpose yet had numerous 
negative externalities that affected the day to day living of the average citizen.  Policymakers 
identified that the transportation system had to go through several substantial modifications in 
order to fix three main issues: congestion, contamination and insecurity (Ureta, 2015).  There 
was an issue regarding congestion because there was a disproportionate number of buses (in 
average 8500 buses) which could often generate a chaotic situation (Ibid).   There was a second 
issue regarding air pollution: policymakers found a direct relationship between the amount of 
buses and the quality of the air, thus there was a need to reduce and improve the buses (Ibid). 
Third problem was the insecurity: bus drivers drove relentlessly and recklessly in the city to 
obtain as many passengers as they could which provoked numerous accidents (Ureta, 2015; 
Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT, 2000).  
The second option in order to tackle the issues of the metropolitan public transportation 
was through completely nationalizing the public transportation system in Santiago since the 
subway system was already under the administration of the Chilean state (Cortázar, 2015; 
Ureta, 2015).  This would be a new transportation reform program that would not only 
discipline micreros but fully abolish their cartel (Ibid).  Political actors and policymakers knew 
that the public transportation in Santiago was unsustainable in the long run (Cortázar, 2015, 
                                                
15 Free translation by researcher. 
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Ureta, 2014; Allende et al, 2007).  Policymakers saw that by not confronting the public 
transportation problems in that previous moment of time, “the high social costs and costs of 
quality of life would be of such magnitude, that it would be difficulty reversible by then”16 
(MOPTT, 2000, p.  9).    
The third option was to try to replicate the Colombian and Brazilian successful public 
policy transportation. Bogota’s Transmilenio and Curitiba’s BRT were known internationally 
for being efficient and effective public transportation (Ureta, 2015; Mardones, 2008; Figueroa 
and Orellana, 2007). Chilean policymakers believed that they could imitate the best parts of 
these two successful policies and create a transportation reform program that would improve 
the quality of life of Santiago’s residents.  The proposal was designed in the year 2000 during 
former President Lagos’ administration and later implemented during President Bachelet’s 
firm term.  
The second indicator to measure critical juncture is to observe if the Transantiago did 
not permit returning to the initial point.  The implementation of the Transantiago did not permit 
a return to the previous transportation system.  There was a change from one day to the other 
and it was impossible to return to it: everything had changed, bus routes, management, 
payment, buses and drivers, metro, infrastructure and the information available (Ureta, 2014).  
As Cortázar (2015, p. 43) states:  
There was no way of returning to the old system of yellow buses and starting all 
over again, it was ok.  They were no longer there.  Many had left to regions.  
There was no room other than moving forward, step by step. 
Furthermore, Cortázar (2015) remembers that after two years of the Big Bang, the 
metropolitan residents stopped asking politicians for the return of the yellow buses because 
there was finally an acceptance that the previous system could not be restored. 
5.1.3 Responding the prediction associated with ‘structure’  
After the overview of the data obtained regarding how the Transantiago could be analyzed from 
the rational decision making approach and the historical institutional approach, certain 
predictions can be accepted while others not.   The initial predictions of this sub section were 
the following: 
 
                                                
16 Free translation by researcher 
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Structure of policies in rational decision making approach: A policy can have an identified 
structure associated with the rational decision making approach if the policy process matches 
Parson’s (1995) policy cycle.   
Structure of policies in historical institutionalism approach: A policy can have an identified 
structure associated with the historical institutionalism approach if the policy follows 
Mahoney’s (2000) path dependency theory. 
It can be concluded, after an in depth analysis, that the structure associated with the 
Transantiago, can be more holistically analyzed throughout the historical institutionalism 
approach rather than the rational decision making approach.  The policy did not function as a 
clock and it did not operate without obstructions.  It did not follow Parsons’ policy cycle 
because it was affected by a myriad of actors: civil society (who did not pay their tariffs), 
Congress and the opposition (who would not approve increasing the subsidies) and bus drivers 
(who did not enforce citizens to pay their tariffs).  The policy was even affected by the economic 
relationship between Chile and Argentina, due to the cuts in exportation of natural gas, it did 
not permit the government to observe the reduction of contamination of the Transantiago 
compared to the former public transportation.   This caused the policy to skip Parsons’ steps 
because it had to adapt to the shocks of the environment, in other words a critical juncture and 
five contingent events.   
 Furthermore, the policy had an identified structure associated with the historical 
institutionalism approach because as narrated previously, it followed Mahoney’s (2000) path 
dependency theory and the concept of critical juncture.  As a conclusion, the prediction 
associated with historical institutionalism is accepted and the prediction associated with 
rational decision making approach is dismissed. 
5.2 Role of the policymaker under the lens of two different theories 
For clarification purposes, it must be stated that there is a utilization of the same sources to 
study the different roles of policymakers.  Therefore, there may be a frequent use of the same 
evidence to observe the presence of indicators of episodic change as well as continuous change. 
Even if the data is the same, the interpretation is different.   
 
5.2.1 Role of the policymaker under the lens of rational decision making change 
It must be recalled that in this thesis, ‘episodic change’ is associated with rational decision 
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making change.  Weick and Quinn state that “the role of the change agent in episodic change is 
that of prime mover who creates change” (1999: 373).  Thus, it will be observed through three 
indicators if Transantiago’s policymakers exhibit traits of a change agent in episodic change.  
(Ibid).   
The first indicator utilized to identify episodic change is observing if policymakers 
communicate differently by establishing alternative schema.  The alternative schema will be 
observed when policymakers communicate about new, dramatic, intentional and planned 
change (Ibid).  Hence, policymakers set out new series of policy strategies, focused on 
immediate, short term fixes rather than long term solutions.         
During Bachelet´s administration, there was a reinterpretation of an alternative, 
intentional and planned schema, this was communicated through the word ‘solution’.  This 
word had the intent of symbolizing the administration carrying out short term goals rather than 
long term goals.  For example, on March 26, 2007, Bachelet decided radically that it was 
necessary to change her cabinet (Ureta, 2015).  This is an example of short-run adaptation 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999). Therefore, the concept of solution materialized in the change of the 
Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications: by asking the resignation of Sergio 
Espejo, a lawyer, and replacing him with René Cortázar, an economist.  Cortázar was perceived 
by the public sphere as the adequate person to “capable of delivering the technical steering 
needed to put Transantiago to work as expected without doing any kind of risky experiment” 
(Ureta, 2015, p. 138)  
The strategy of her Secretary to amend the Transantiago was through the 
‘normalization’ of the policy.   Cortázar mentioned frequently to the press the word 
‘normalized’ and ‘normalization’.  The reinterpretation of ‘normal’ was associated with   
stabilization of the public policy (“Cortázar dice”, 2009, January 9; Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 
2014; Ureta, 2015). Ureta (2015, p. 17) establishes that the concept of normalization has two 
uses for a policymaker: to describe and prescribe, “the normal always lies in this tension; it 
describes a supposedly average reality while at the same time it performs a desirable state 
toward which the existing reality should evolve”.   Ureta (2015, p. 17) quotes Foucault (2007, 
p. 17) in order to define normalization as a Normalization has a double process: 
First of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a 
certain result [;] and the operation of disciplinary normalization consist of trying 
to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model. 
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Hence, this concept was utilized to explain to the public how immediate, short term 
fixes would occur to ‘fix’ the initial errors of the implementation of the Transantiago.  Cortázar 
‘normalization’ strategy went through two stages. The first, when he admitted the failures of 
the Transantiago, as abnormal results and as “a result of erroneous implementation of the 
system’s blueprint” (Ureta, 2015, p. 140).   This is another example of short-run adaptation 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999).  A ‘normal’ implementation of the Transantiago would have been 
in accordance with the original PTUS policy manuscript.   Hence, when he accepted the failure 
of the implementation of the policy of delivering a ‘world-class’ public transportation, this 
became a reaffirmation of the government’s commitment of achieving a technocratic and 
efficient solution (Ureta, 2015).  In summary, “progress and the normal state became 
inextricably linked” (Hacking, 1990, p. 168)” (Ibid: 140).  
The second step of the ‘normalization’ strategy was to implement numerous 
disciplinary devices so all actors within the political, public, societal and entrepreneurial sphere 
would follow the new ‘normalization’ plan (Ibid).   His normalization strategy was based in 
quantitative standards within a temporal framework: extended bus routes, larger bus fleets, 
reshuffling of routes, increasing the number of bus stop shelters, among other solutions (Ibid).    
Some of these actors immediately aligned with the new script from the MTT.   Cortázar was 
forced to utilize “more direct disciplinary devices, even threatening the most rebellious 
components (such as the entrepreneurs running the bus network) with outright exclusion from 
the system” (2015, p. 140).  He furthermore promised to quit by the end of the year 2007 if 
these short term implementations had not been carried out (Cortázar, 2015).  In the end, 
Bachelet did not allow him to quit and he continued in his position until the end of her first 
administration (Ibid).   It must be highlighted that Cortázar’s immediate effort of implementing 
a ‘solution’ to amend the Transantiago on the year 2007 is an example of short-run adaptation 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999).   
Nevertheless, the continuation of the ‘normalization’ strategy became a long-run 
adaptation or a permanent manner to fix this failed policy which is aligned to continuous 
change rather than episodic change.  This ‘normalization’ strategy continued during Piñera’s 
administration, in the search of efficiency of a public good.  For example, he has stated that his 
government is committed to solve Transantiago´s problems through efficient mechanisms 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016f).      
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 As a summary, this indicator could be considered as fulfilled by the year 2007 because 
it was an intentional and planned change.  Nevertheless, it was not a new change (it was the 
intent of applying the measures of the PTUS document) nor it provided a new public 
transportation.   A new change would have been the implementation of a drastic, radical new 
policy such as nationalizing the metropolitan public transportation or returning to the former 
system of public transportation (with the micros amarillas, yellow buses) (Cortázar, 2015).  
Therefore, the communication of alternative schema was carried out but it became later on 
reinterpreted as a continual mechanism to adapt and improve the policy.  Therefore, it is 
contradicted.    
The second indicator is the reinterpretation of revolutionary triggers (reinterpretation 
of the errors and faults of the Transantiago). Weick and Quinn (1999, p. 369) define inertia as 
“the inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environment”.   Transantiago’s ‘Big 
Bang’ was a consequence of inertia, the inability of Bachelet’s administration to adapt a public 
policy to the demands of the environment.   Big Bang is the consequence of the inertia, in other 
words, the failure of the government to implement efficiently the Transantiago.  Therefore, 
policymakers acknowledged the inertia of the government after the Big Bang.    
Numerous policymakers started to apologize for the faulty implementation and for the 
learning anxiety that this had caused on civil society as well as the political sphere (Figueroa, 
2013; Weick and Quinn, 1999).  Former President Ricardo Lagos, who is the author of 
Transantiago’s design was the only policymaker who did not apologize immediately for the 
faulty implementation.  He simply did not assume his responsibility for the policy (“Lagos y 
el Transantiago”, 2008, September 1).   He declared to the press that his responsibility was in 
the design and not in the implementation in the year 2008, therefore, since the Transantiago 
was not implemented during his administration, he was clear of fault (Ibid).   After the pressure 
of the senators and the press, he did a ‘mea culpa’ and admitted his responsibility.  He later 
confessed in an interview that the worst thing he accomplished during his administration was 
designing the Transantiago: “I was wrong when we designed the Transantiago. In what sense? 
Nobody obliged me because everyone accepted the yellow buses, but a decision had to be taken 
and a different way of ordering the transit in Santiago”17 (“Ricardo Lagos”, 2015, May 4).  
                                                
17 Free translation by researcher.  
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It must be highlighted that Bachelet and Piñera are known to have very different 
communicational styles. Bachelet has the capacity to interact better with citizens, who identify 
more with her because she is a woman, a doctor and a mother.  She uses more adjectives to 
describe events or pubic policies (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016).  President 
Bachelet said during the change of cabinet on March 27th, 2007 that “here things have not been 
done well… and the civil society deserves an apology¨18 (Cortázar, 2015: 37).  According to 
Cortázar (2015), ‘Transantiago’ became a ‘bad word’ for Bachelet: she would not pronounce 
it nor mention the word ‘Transantiago’ during her annual presidential speech for three years in 
a row (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016c; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional 
de Chile, 2006d: Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016e; Cortázar, 2015).  When 
questioned in an interview about the worst part of 2007, she responded “the worst of 2007, 
Transantiago, there is no question about it.  The biggest mistake is the Transantiago”19 
(Bachelet: Lo peor del 2007, 2007, December 26).  It must be highlighted that the Chilean 
Congressional Committee never held responsible former President Lagos or President Bachelet 
(Allende et al, 2007). 
Former President Sebastian Piñera, a famous businessman, has a contrasting manner of 
communicating towards civil society compared with Bachelet.  Piñera is more laconic towards 
citizens and communicates to the press in a more succinct, technical discourse with less 
adjectives (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016f).  He started talking about the 
Transantiago after 2010 because his administration was focused on the reconstruction of the 
south of Chile after the 2010 earthquake.  Hence, most of comments about the Transantiago 
occur later on during his administration and cannot be mentioned in the thesis because the time 
frame of the study is between the years 2007 to 2010.   
Secretary Morandé utilized frequently the word “lament”, to state his apologies towards 
civil society regarding the increase of tariffs and of the implementation of the policy.  He once 
described the Transantiago as “it’s a great sorrow, I am very sorry”20  (“Ministro Morandé 
proyecta”, 2010, June 9). He also mentioned in interviews several times the word ‘backpack’ 
in the sense that the Transantiago was a baggage that Piñera’s administration inherited 
(“Ministro Morandé presenta”, 2010, September 7).  
                                                
18 Free translation by researcher. 
19 Free translation by researcher. 
20 Free translation by researcher 
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As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that policymakers did 
reinterpret the revolutionary triggers of the Transantiago.  Hence, this indicator was present.     
The third indicator to measure episodic change is that the policymaker needs to build 
commitment and coordination in order to amend a policy (Weick and Quinn, 1999).  For 
successful policies to occur, it is needed the support of political actors to concur and agree on 
the subjects, such as the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cortázar, 2015; Cofré, 2015).  
The deep and structural reforms which have been most successful in Chile and are stable 
thought out long periods of time have been due to the technical and political ample agreements 
between actors (Cofré, 2015).   The error of the Transantiago was that it was designed and 
implemented through an administrative way, without political consensus from political actors 
or civil society (Cortázar, 2015; Cofré, 2015). Due to the Transantiago’s administrative 
implementation, policymakers, such as Cortázar, had to learn to create gradual changes in the 
policy with the participation of civil society as well as political actors (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 
2015).  
In the search of building commitment and coordination among different political sectors, 
Bachelet would often use the expression “mirada país” (a country look)21.  This expression 
signifies to have an overall view of the country’s problems and priorities.  For example, she 
would state that senators and congressmen needed to have ‘a country look’ in order to approve 
a subsidy for the Transantiago (Ibid).   Cortázar was the prime actor who sought for leverage 
between numerous actors within the public sphere. He utilized different methods for the 
construction of agreements within the Transantiago: win-win, win-lose, lose-win and sum zero 
(Ibid).  The win–lose solution was used when some operators who were not being financially 
successful had to stop operating with the AFT (Ibid).  Other solution, lose-win, took place 
when senators who criticized the Transantiago and Cortázar tried to not to respond to their 
statements because the administration needed the support of the opposition for passing subsidy 
laws (Ibid).  Other approaches such as win-win, was used when dealing with the renegotiation 
of the contracts of 2007 and 2009 with the bus operators, permitting the immediate 
improvement of bus transportation (Ibid).  Furthermore, the win-win approach can be acquired 
more easily though loyalty with political actors and it was the main tool used in order to obtain 
more subsidies in congress for the transportation service (Ibid).    
                                                
21 Free translation by researcher. 
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Cortázar tried to seek leverage with civil society, stating that if he was not able to fulfill 
his promises, he would quit as minister of transportation and telecommunications (Ibid).  
Cortázar furthermore aimed for leverage within Bachelet’s administration.  During political 
crisis, it is usual to change the whole cabinet: which meant not only the secretary of 
transportation but also all the chain of command (Ibid).  Nevertheless, Cortázar decided that 
the initial cabinet of the Sub-Secretary of Transportation had knowledge which could not be 
easily obtained of transferred to new workers (Ibid). 
Sebastian Piñera’s Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications, Felipe 
Morandé, also searched for commitment and coordination.   Morandé had a political priority 
to seek agreement with the opposition as well urgently dialogue with the Parliament in order 
to obtain more subsidies in order to stop the increase of tariffs (Toro, 2010, August 2).  He 
stated: “the route is clear, correct the errors of the model and search consensus among all 
political sectors”22 (Ibid).  He would argument that it was essential to fix the Transantiago 
because it was a policy that in the long term was financially unsustainable, he affirmed that the 
costs of the Transantiago are double of its income (Ministro de Transportes: "Situación 
financiera del Transantiago es insostenible", 2010, May 11):  
For every peso that enters there are two that are spent.  This is an 
unsustainable situation from a financial point of view.  There is a subsidy 
that exists that aids to finance this, but currently it is not sufficient and 
that is why we need to fix the system by reducing its costs.23 
As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be concluded that policymakers did 
built commitment and coordination among different actors in order to amend the Transantiago.  
Hence, this indicator was present. 
5.2.2 Role of the policymaker under the lens of historical institutionalism 
approach 
It must be remembered that in this thesis, ‘continuous change’ is associated with historical 
institutionalism change.  There are three indicators which shall be utilized to identify the change 
agent in continuous change.   It is important to also observe if the policymaker does not have 
the prime role of establishing change, the change agent redirects change (Weick and Quinn, 
                                                
22 Free translation by researcher. 
23 Free translation by researcher. 
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1999).  
The first indicator is that the policymaker recognizes and reframes current patters 
(Ibid).  This indicator will be interpreted when policymaker recognizes the errors of the 
Transantiago and tries to reframe the policy.  Therefore, the first thing that Cortázar (2015) did 
when he assumed as Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications was to recognize 
the gravity of the Transantiago and the failure of its implementation. Other political actors 
associated with the policy were deemed directly responsible by the Congressional Committee 
for the failure of the Transantiago.  These actors were Sergio Espejo (Secretary of 
Transportation), Danilo Núñez (the Sub-Secretary of Transportation), Pablo Rodríguez (the 
SEREMI of Transportation), Fernando Promis (Coordinator of Transantiago), Henry Malbrán 
and Aldo Signorelli (Directors of SECTRA) (Ibid).   
Other actors recognized their involvement in the implementation of the policy. Andrés 
Navarro, president of SONDA, said “I make myself completely responsible personally of 
SONDA” being the technological operator of the Transantiago (“Sonda revela su verdad sobre 
el Transantiago y pone de manifiesto los errores del Gobierno”, 2007, May 10th).  Furthermore, 
Pablo Rodríguez, SEREMI of Transportation recognizes his responsibility in not foreseeing the 
social impact that the lack of infrastructure and technological support of the Transantiago 
(Allende et al, 2007).  He stated to the Commission that if he had reflected more about the 
subject, he would have postponed the implementation of the Transantiago (Ibid). 
President Bachelet referred to this policy as the worst public policy of her government 
and of the former reigning Chilean political coalition called “la Concertación” (Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016e). Bachelet stated in her presidential annual speech in 2009 
that the transportation in Santiago: 
Needed a radical change and the decision was to confront that challenge.  But I 
have already said in its moment: things were done poorly.  This reform has been 
a bad and frustrating experience for an immense majority of santiaguinos, and 
especially for the poorer sectors24 (Ibid).    
After the recognition of policymakers of their errors and involvement regarding the 
Transantiago, a reframing of the policy occurred.  Remembering that Weick and Quinn (1999) 
described continuous change as cumulative, evolving and ongoing, the reframing of the policy 
                                                
24 Free translation by researcher. 
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is also accumulative and evolving.  The authors stated that this type of change is based on 
notion of ¨small continuous adjustments, created simultaneously across units, can cumulate 
and create substantial change¨ (Ibid: 375).  The policy was ‘reframed’ through Cortázar’s 
‘normalization’ strategy after he took the role as Secretary of MTT.  The ‘normalization’ 
strategy has been mentioned in the previous section, remembering that it was composed of 
short term goals.  Nevertheless, these incremental adjustments were carried out over a period 
of time in order to provide a better metropolitan public transportation service.   
Cortázar declared on November 21, 2007, to a Parliamentary Committee, that amending 
the policy itself would take time, which is parallel to the definition of Weick and Quinn (1999) 
conceptualization of continuous change, of a continuous, evolutionary change. Continuous 
change can be observed when the changes that are needed to improve the Transantiago without 
an end date: the policy is “still very much under repair, it has never become fully normalized 
in accordance with the script set out in 2000” (Ureta, 2015, p. 155).  Cortázar’s ‘normalization’ 
strategy is furthermore, a reframing of a public policy which is already in a self-reproducing 
sequence because it is in a historical lock-in, in other words, it can only be modified, not 
changed (Ureta, 2015; Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). 
As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that policymakers did 
recognize and reframe the Transantiago.  First, policymakers and actors involved in the 
implementation recognized their responsibilities regarding the failed implementation of the 
Transantiago.  Second, they reframed the Transantiago within its historical lock-in (Mahoney 
and Schensul, 2006). Hence, this indicator was present.      
The second indicator is that the policymaker carries out intentional change at the margin 
of the policy.  This indicator is measured by Lindblom’s (1959) definition of incrementalism.  
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that most successful public policies in Chile, 
associated to the creation of laws, pensions, health system, are created incrementally (Cortázar, 
2015).  The Transantiago was a radical public policy because it was not created in the historical 
manner that public policies are usually established in Chile.   Successful Chilean policies are 
those that are gradually improved, from administrative and legal variables, in order for 
policymakers to comprehend which action is preferable (Ibid). However, not all policies can 
be carried out gradually, in absence of reforms, these can explode from a social, political or 
economic standpoint (Ibid).   
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Lindblom mentions that policymakers face limitations due to its short term solutions, in 
other words, the intentional changes at the margin of the policy (Lindblom, 1959; Weick and 
Quinn, 1999).  Not only did were the changes to stabilize the Transantiago were of short-term 
solutions, the modifications had to occur one at a time.  According to Cortázar (2015), 
modifications to the Transantiago had to occur one at a time and not all al once.  This was not 
due to the lack of political willingness from Bachelet’s administration, it was simply due to the 
feasible of carrying these changes all at once (Ibid).  It was not possible to carry out all of the 
changes to ‘normalize’ the Transantiago because the Transantiago was operating while the 
changes were carried out (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, Transantiago was not a public policy that needed to be implemented 
radically, its implementation caused a culture shock, where people’s routines were drastically 
changed 180 degrees, it was not necessary to produce this cultural shock to the civil society 
and it could have been avoided if politicians had considered experts’ advice and knowledge 
regarding the subject (Cofré, 2015; PTUS, 2000; Hales et al, 2007; Ureta, 2014; Mardones, 
2008).   Therefore, after the Big Bang, the administrations of Bachelet and later on Piñera, had 
to carry out gradually, intentional changes (Ureta, 2015; Cortázar, 2015).  The Transantiago 
had to go through different administrations, which redirected the policy’s goals because the 
policy as well as society’s needs evolved over time.  Political crises, such as the implementation 
of the Transantiago, according to Cortázar (2015) had to be fixed with a compass rather than a 
watch due to the limitation of short term solutions in spite of the necessity of long term changes 
in the policy (Ibid).  
Cortázar states that it is a common error for policymakers to prefer to establish quick 
changes rather than use a compass to identify and establish the priorities that a policy and a 
country needs (Ibid).  Bachelet used the ‘logic of attraction’, modifying her cabinet and 
replacing Sergio Espejo and replacing with René Cortázar as Secretary of Transportation and 
Telecommunications in order to appeal to politicians as well as civil society, that by modifying 
her cabinet, her administration would redirect leadership in order to make the Transantiago an 
effective policy. After René Cortázar accepted his role of Secretary of Transportation and 
Telecommunications on March 27th, 2007, he and his team decided to gradually confront the 
Big Bang’s problems (Cortázar, 2015).  Later on, during Piñera’s administration, his Secretary 
of Transportation and Telecommunications, Felipe Morandé, also carried out the intentional 
changes at the margin of the policy.  He decided to adapt the policy and update it through 15 
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measures in order to improve the Transantiago (“Ministro Morandé presenta plan”, 2010, 
September 7).   He said that these 15 measures would: 
Solve this mega error from the previous administrations and to return the dignity 
of the users of the Transantiago and we will do it with real, concrete actions and 
which will go in direct benefice foe the users25 (Ibid). 
As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that Chilean policymakers 
did carried out intentional change at the margin of the Transantiago.  Hence, this indicator was 
present.        
The third indicator utilized to identify continuous change is by observing if the 
policymaker utilizes mechanisms such as learning, improvisation and translation (Weick and 
Quinn, 1999). Remembering that incrementalism is based on trials and errors (Lindblom, 
1959), Cortázar utilized this technique in order to remedy the public transportation policy.  
According to Cortázar (2015), the Transantiago had grave design issues but were discovered 
after its implementation, thus it was impossible to stop the policy and modify it because it 
would signify denying millions of residents in Santiago the access to public transportation.  
Due to its fault design “we had to learn from the errors and correct them, redesign the system, 
but while this continue to be in operation”26 (Ibid: 55).  His team had to “develop new solutions 
and extend them to the entirety of the system once they had been proven to be effective”27 
(Ibid: 54). The improvisation tool was utilized through incremental changes, which were 
carried out because there was a lack of options for amending the Transantiago.  Due to the Big 
Bang as a critical juncture, Bachelet’s administration could not go back in time and prevent the 
policy from being implemented.  Therefore, her administration was forced to use incrementalist 
measures, which were per se difficult because actors from different spheres (civil society, press, 
the senators, the government) all wanted an immediate solution (Cortázar, 2015).       
Morandé also applied techniques such as improvisation. Differently from the previous 
Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications, Cortázar, Morandé utilized Twitter in 
order to communicate to citizens about the Transantiago (“Panel de expertos”, 2010, August 
12).  He also implemented braille system in Transantiago’s buses, which is another way to 
improve communication between users and government (Valencia, 2010, November 12) 
                                                
25 Free translation by researcher. 
26 Free translation by researcher. 
27 Free translation by researcher 
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Another form of improvisation was when he encouraged citizens to utilize Transantiago’s app 
so they could learn the buses’ schedules. (“Internet y SMS”, 2010, November 4). He even 
decided to start a campaign of recollection of suggestions to improve the Transantiago 
(Coordinación General de Transportes de Santiago, 2010, December 1).  All of these 
improvisation techniques were incrementalist measures in order for Piñera’s administration to 
‘learn’ what citizens wanted from this public good.      As a summary of the study of this 
indicator, it can be stated that Chilean policymakers used mechanisms such as learning, 
improvisation and translation in order to amend the Transantiago (Weick and Quinn, 1999).   
Thus, this indicator was present.       
The fourth indicator to identify continuous change is to observe if policymakers’ 
language was altered, thus giving a new identity to the Transantiago, hence changing civil 
society’s perception of the policy.  It must be distinguished the differences of studying 
politicians’ and policymakers’ discourse in episodic change and continuous change.  The 
policymaker who carries out episodic change communicate differently in order to establish 
alternative, new, dramatic, intentional and planned change (Ibid).  The policymaker who carries 
out continuous change will also communicate differently, yet the justification of the nature of 
speech is to bestow a new identity to the Transantiago, by altering civil society’s perception of 
the policy. 
As the policy evolved over the years, so did the meaning of the policymakers’ words 
towards the Transantiago. The concept ‘Transantiago’ was associated with policy failure.  
Ureta (2015, p. 141) obtained a declaration of Matias Rojas, a high authority from the MTT, 
who described the Transantiago: 
Nowadays Transantiago has become a villain, it is a generic word.  As when 
people say that they’re going to make a Xerox: it wasn’t a brand, it was a 
synonym for a photocopy.  Transantiago is a synonym of… the trans-this, the 
trans-lousy, the trans… it has become a synonym of a traumatic situation.  It is 
quite difficult to fight against a generic name once it has been born, and 
therefore what we have to aspire to is to continue improving the system, to 
consolidate it, and know that these are social processes that have a periodicity, 
have a slow tempo and…take time (Ibid). 
Furthermore, over the years, the word ‘Transantiago’ acquired a double meaning.  It 
was not only the name of a policy, it became the synonym of a political, avoidable mistake or 
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a policymaker’s error in judgment.  For example, while describing Bachelet’s second term, 
Piñera said in an interview: 
 Yes, we have to make reforms, the crossroads is how we do them, good 
reforms versus bad, and that is why we all have to make the, not some against 
others, better well thought reforms.  I thought that the Transantiago had gave 
them a lesson, but I see that human beings are capable of tripping twice with 
the same rock (López and Sapag, 2014, December 26). 
Ureta (2015, p. 160) described that the Transantiago became an example of policy failure: 
“instead of territorializing a world –class public transportation s systems and its happy users, 
the implementation of Transantiago has remained a world–class mess, the ultimate 
materialization of a failed policy assemblage”.  Furthermore, he describes it as perpetual failing 
public policy ““which continues to exist yet fails to achieve…[its] avowed objectives over long 
periods of time” (Hood, 2000, p. 44)” (Ureta, 2015, p. 55).  As a summary of the study of this 
indicator, it can be established that Chilean policymakers used new language to describe the 
Transantiago as a failed policy rather than an efficient policy.  As a conclusion, this indicator 
was present.       
5.2.3 Responding the prediction associated with ‘role of the policymaker’ 
Before concluding regarding the predictions associated with the ‘role of the policymakers’ these 
must be remembered. These were: 
Role of the policymaker in Rational Decision Making Approach:  the role of the policymaker 
can be associated with rational decision making approach, if such policymakers, in the role of 
the change agents, are involved in episodic change (Weick and Quinn, 1995).    
Role of the policymaker in Historical Institutionalism Approach:  the role of the policymaker 
can be associated with the historical institutionalism approach, if such policymakers, in the role 
of the change agents, are involved in continuous change.  
Therefore, rational decision making approach was associated with policymakers 
carrying out episodic change while as historical institutionalism approach was associated with 
policymakers carrying out continuous change. It is important to state that after the 
implementation of the Transantiago, policymakers carried out continuous change rather than 
episodic change.  Both Presidents studied in this thesis (Bachelet and Piñera) redirected their 
leadership and authority, towards theirs Secretaries of MTT, who later became in charge of 
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‘redirecting’ change (Weick and Quinn, 1999).   A very notable example of this type of 
leadership was carried out when Bachelet once said in a rally she said “we are going to call 
again Secretary Cortázar to tell him that he needs to fix the routes once and for all” (Morales, 
2008, September 4).   Furthermore, the maneuvers carried out by these two Secretaries between 
the years 2007 to 2010 were predominantly of long term goals.   
Table 20: Predictions regarding the role of the policymaker according to different theories 
Type of 
change Indicators Present 
Episodic 
Change 
Communicate differently by establishing alternative schema No 
Reinterpretation of revolutionary triggers Yes 
Build commitment and coordination Yes 
Continuous 
change 
Recognizes and reframes current patterns Yes 
Carries out intentional change at the margin of the policy Yes 
Policymakers will utilize mechanisms such as learning, 
improvisation and translation Yes 
Utilizes different language, thus altering meaning in certain 
parts of a policy Yes 
Table created by researcher. 
The behavior of policymakers, as it can be observed in table 20, establishes that their 
behavior was more parallel to continuous change rather than episodic change.   Policymakers 
involved in the Transantiago carried out both types of changes: continuous and episodic.  
Nevertheless, through the throughout analysis of the indicators, the change agent carries out 
continuous change more than episodic change.   
As a conclusion to this sub-section, it can be stated that the prediction for the role of the 
policymaker in historical intuitionalism approach is accepted and the prediction for the role of 
the policymaker in rational decision making approach is rejected.        
5.3 Chapter Summary: Theoretical analysis of Transantiago’s structure and 
policymakers 
In this chapter, there was an analysis of “how did the policy implementation continue after the 
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initial failure?”  This was carried out through the theoretical study of two predictions (structure 
and role of the policymaker).  Regarding the prediction of structure as well as role of the 
policymaker: historical institutionalism explains more holistically these two predictions 
compared to rational decision making approach. After Transantiago’s initial failed policy 
implementation, the structure of the policy was carried out in a historical institutionalism 
structure and its policymakers, as change agents, carried out continuous change rather than 
episodic change.  Hence, the rational decision making predictions were rejected and the 
historical institutionalism predictions accepted.   
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Chapter 6: Transantiago by 2010, policy success or policy failure? 
In this last section, the Transantiago will be scrutinized and evaluated, to observe if after three 
years of its implementation, if it has become a policy success or policy failure.   The third sub-
question in this thesis is to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success 
in 2010?  Therefore, it will be utilized the same four indicators of the official objectives from 
section one as well as the approval rates of the policy.  
 
6.1 Fulfilment of objectives by the year 2010 
This section of efficient use of resources is segmented into three parts: citizens’ participation, 
institutional modernization at a metropolitan level and policy efficiency.   
 
6.1.1 Efficient use of resources 
Efficient use of resources was segmented into three sections: citizens’ participation, 
institutional modernization at a metropolitan level and policy efficiency.   
6.1.1.1 Presence of ‘citizen participation’ 
Remembering that by the end of the year 2007, a formal ‘citizen inspector’ was not 
accomplished.   Policymakers who designed PTUS had envisioned that the ‘citizen inspector’ 
would be a volunteer citizen denouncing to the Sub secretary of Transportation regarding tariff 
evaders (MOPTT, 2000).   However, by the year 2010, the Metropolitan Transportation 
SEREMI has not done much regarding enforcing passengers to pay their tariffs.  They have 
been more involved regarding the measuring of evasion more than actually taking concrete 
steps to end it.  As Guarda, Galilea, Paget-Seekins and Ortúzar describe (2015, p. 56):  
The Enforcement Commission of the Chilean Transport Ministry (MTT) collects 
data about evasion on a sample of bus routes of each private operating company 
every month using plain-clothes observers. Within the sample of bus routes a 
sample of runs (bus trips) are selected. Observers are stationed at each door of 
the sampled bus and register the number of people boarding and alighting at each 
bus stop, by each door of the bus, as well as other conditions such as bus 
occupancy. They also register the number of evasions, but do not interact with 
the passengers in an enforcement capacity. 
By the year 2008, a new law offered an innovative way for citizens to state their 
opinions about the policy and as a by-product, denounce tariff evaders and other irregularities 
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of the Transantiago.  Hence, the promulgation of law 20.285 was decisive for citizens to feel 
more encouraged to participate in overseeing the proper functioning of the Transantiago.  This 
law, published on the 20th of August of 2008, regulates the principle of transparency of state 
administration, establishing that “every person has the right to request and receive information 
from any organ of the Administration of the State”28 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
Chile, 2016a).  As a consequence, this law permits citizens to access information elaborated by 
the State budget as well as State’s acts and resolutions (Ibid).  These documents come from 
ministries, regional governments, municipalities, Armed Forces, among other institutions and 
public services as well as public companies and those which the State owns more than 50% of 
the actions (Ibid).  A citizen can request this information electronically, by sending an email to 
the institution or using the Transparency website or physically by mail or by going to a OIRS 
(Office for Information, Claims and Suggestions; Oficina de Informaciones, Reclamos y 
Sugerencias) (Consejo de Transparencia, 2016).  The State by law has five working days to 
respond to the citizens’ requests (Ibid). 
These OIRS were established in every public institution, including one for the DTPM 
(Directory of Metropolitan Public Transportation; Directorio de Transporte Público 
Metropolitano).  Thus, people had finally an outlet permitting them to voice their concerns and 
stating irregularities that were not seen by inspectors.  This is the closest the concept of ‘citizen 
inspector’, a citizen who states information regarding the Transantiago, out of sheer public 
duty, not paid.  As a consequence, a type of citizen inspector had emerged but it was not due 
to the State ‘good will’ to make people participate more regarding the process of inspecting the 
Transantiago.  As a conclusion, the State was never able to create a ‘citizen inspector’, thus 
this objective was not fulfilled.  The participation of citizens in inspecting or giving their 
opinions regarding the Transantiago was more of a byproduct of law 20.285 rather than a 
byproduct of the implementation of the Transantiago. 
The second indicator, ‘citizens’ respect towards paying transportation tariffs can be 
measuring if citizens are respecting the norms of utilizing the Transantiago through measuring 
the rate of evasion.  As it can be observed in table 21 and graph 1, since 2007, the evasion has 
grown almost 1 % every year.  In Graph 1, the observation of the steady growth of evasion 
during the first three years of implementation is substantial.   In table 21, it can be observed that 
the percentage of evasion was 13,7% in 2007 and by 2010, it was 18%.  In other words, in 
                                                
28 Free translation by researcher. 
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between 2007 until 2010, the tariff evasion grew 30%.  The problem with evasion of tariffs is 
that it is a transversal issue for policymakers, it does not respect socioeconomic statuses, gender 
or age (Araus, 2013).  There is even a taxonomy for the Chilean transportation tariff evader.  
There are two type of tariff evaders: the opportunity tariff evader and the hard tariff evader 
(Ibid).  The opportunity tariff evader is the evader who due to having insufficient amount on 
his/her card will take advantage of not paying while as a hard tariff evader is someone who 
permanently transgress the law (Ibid). 
Graph 1: Percentage of evasion in the Transantiago between the years 2007 to 2010 
 
Graph created by researcher with additional information (Valencia, 2011) 
Table 21: Percentage of evasion in the Transantiago between the years 2007 to 2010 
Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Percentage of Evasion (%) 13,4 14 15 18 
    Table created by researcher with additional information (Valencia, 2011). 
The main problem associated with evasion is the lack of incentives for bus drivers to 
enforce passengers to pay and vice versa.  From the year 2007, after the instalment of the better 
working conditions, bus drivers had no longer the incentive of obliging passengers to pay the 
transportation fee.  Similarly, passengers no longer felt the need to pay the tariff since the bus 
driver was not forcing them to do so. As the General Coordinator for the Transantiago, Ana 
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Luisa Covarrubias once said that those ‘civilians’ who haven’t paid the tariffs had not fulfilled 
their ‘duty’ with the public transportation (“Transantiago: Realizan”, 2010, April 23).  Hence, 
the word ‘duty’ and ‘civilians’’ has a heavy connotation and association with good citizen.  She 
describes that through establishing inspectors to observe if users are paying their tariffs, the 
government is dealing with an ethical issue.  The government thus is trying to appeal to citizens’ 
civic values regarding the issue of tariff evasion, stating that evaders should take conscience of 
their actions (Ibid).    The General Coordinator states that the majority of ‘honest’ citizens are 
those who do fulfil their citizen commitments (Ibid).  Thus, just like John Stuart Mill once said 
“a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case 
he is justly accountable to them for the injury” (1865, p. 7).  
Adam Smith once said that “public services are never better performed than when their 
reward comes in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence 
employed in performing them” (2003, p. 719).    He also narrates that:    
  The interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his 
emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does, or does not 
perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest…either to neglect 
it altogether, or…to perform it in [a] careless and slovenly a manner (p. 760).   
Thus, when bus drivers become at ease with their stable salaries and without the need 
to compete for passengers, they also felt the ease to neglect part of their obligations as bus 
drivers which was to oblige citizens to pay the bus tariffs.  This is problematic for the 
government because they are then forced to increase subsidies to the metropolitan transportation 
and reduce subsidies in other areas such as health or to request international loans, which 
increases the country’s debts.  As a conclusion for this section, citizens do not respect the norms 
needed to implement the policy because the tariff evasion is diminishing the efficiency of the 
Transantiago.     
As a summary of this section, it can be observed that by the year 2010, a formal ‘citizen 
inspector’ was never created, however civil society behaved as ‘citizen inspectors’ when they 
denounced to the OIRS about problems associated to the Transantiago.  Regarding the Citizens’ 
respect towards the norms, by the year 2010, 18% of passengers were not paying their 
transportation tariffs. Therefore, the indicator of citizen participation was not fulfilled.  
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6.1.1.2 Creation of a Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transportation 
As analyzed in the first section of this chapter, a Metropolitan Authority of Urban 
Transportation was established.  
When studying the second indicator, the creation of the Coordination Committee of 
Public Transportation, as mentioned previously, former President Lagos, on the year 2003, 
created a committee that could oversee that the public transportation in Santiago had the proper 
authorities in order for the policy to operate efficiently (Presidencia de la República, 2003).    
This committee had the authority regarding the operations of the Transantiago and remained to 
do so until the year 2013, when former President Piñera replaced the committee and created a 
new institution called Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano (DTPM) or Directory 
of Metropolitan Public Transportation that had similar sub-departments and carried out alike 
multidisciplinary tasks (Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano, 2015). As a 
conclusion of this section, it can be affirmed that the objective was fulfilled and there was the 
creation of the authority needed to administer the Transantiago as a public policy. 
The committee proposed in the year 2000 in the policy PTUS. Nevertheless, this 
committee nowadays is not the identical representation of what was proposed in PTUS on the 
year 2000 (MOPTT, 2000).  PTUS stated that there should be a ‘Coordination Committee of 
Public Transportation’ that represents three different sectors: the different institutions, the 
transportation operators and civil society.  There would be meetings between the three groups 
in order to evaluate thoroughly the functioning of the policy in itself and propose tasks to 
improve it to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority.  In DTPM, there only a committee of 
representatives of different institutions.  A group representing civil society and a group 
representing transportation drivers and operators is not present.  As a conclusion, the Committee 
has not fulfilled PTUS’ objective of having an inclusive committee to discuss and compare 
solutions for issues associated with the Transantiago. 
PTUS stated that there should be a ‘Coordination Committee of Public Transportation’ 
that represents three different sectors: the different institutions, the transportation operators and 
civil society.  There would be meetings between the three groups in order to evaluate 
thoroughly the functioning of the policy in itself and propose tasks to improve it to the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority.  The committee in the year 2007 only represented the 
politician sector.  A group representing civil society and a group representing transportation 
drivers and operators is not present.  As a conclusion, the Committee has not fulfilled PTUS’ 
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objective of having an inclusive committee to discuss and compare solutions for issues 
associated with the Transantiago. 
The third indicator was the reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds or 
‘Fondo de Mejora de Locomoción Colectiva´ (MOPTT, 2000).   Only by September 1st, 2009, 
this fund was replaced by a new national subsidy for public transportation, law nº 20.378 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2009).  This law bestowed ah permanent subsidy 
of $US 267,857 dollars to the metropolitan transportation (Ibid).  It was later reformulated on 
the year 2013, due to the contingent event of the earthquake in 2010.   As a consequence, law 
nº 20.378 was annexed to law 20.696, which bestowed an additional US $690,909 dollars to 
the metropolitan regions as well as to the rest of the regions in Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2013).  The Administrative Counsel Funds has been efficiently reformulated 
thus, this objective can be considered as completed.  
As a summary for the fulfilment of the objective, the creation of a metropolitan 
authority of urban transportation between the years 2007 to 2010, it can be concluded that this 
objective was fulfilled by the year 2010.  Therefore, this objective has been fulfilled to 
completion.    
6.1.1.3 Policy efficiency 
Policy efficiency refers to the government’s respect towards the initial planned budget, which 
bestows the Transantiago from the State arcs an annual budget of US $200 million dollars 
(MOPTT, 2000).   Observing table 22, it can be observed that by the year 2010, Transantiago 
had a deficit of US $755,3 million dollars (Gómez-Lobo, 2012).   
Table 22:  Transantiago’s deficit between the years 2007 to 2010 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Deficit (million USD) 371.5 824.6 794.8 755.3 
    Table replicated from Gómez-Lobo (2012, p. 35) 
Cortázar (2000) has three main explanations to justify why this public policy failed in 
its objective to be financially efficient.  First, there was a lower recollection of revenue from 
tickets once a standard transportation tariff was established for the utilization of both subway 
and buses (since subways tickets were historically more expensive) (Cortázar, 2015).  Second, 
the lack of functioning of the ‘Bip!’ card during the first week of Transantiago’s 
 91 
implementation caused a significant loss of revenue (Ibid).  Third, the financial deficit became 
aggravated due to citizens’ tariff evasion.  The magnitude of the deficit, which doubled three 
years after the implementation of the Transantiago can be observed in the following table. 
The government of Chile had its hands tied regarding how to solve this economical 
dilemma.   Thus, they had to apply to international and national credits. They had previously 
been bestowed two credits (one of US $ 4,8 million dollars and US $ 30 million dollars) by the 
World Bank in 2005 to finance the Transantiago, later on by the same institution they lent to 
the state of Chile US $6,8 million dollars in 2010 (World Bank, 2010; “Banco Mundial otorgará 
tres préstamos”, 2005, July 6; Goller, 2013, April 11).  The Chilean government applied for a 
credit from the IDB of US $35,4 million dollars (MOP, 2007).  Furthermore, it also applied for 
a credit of US $160 million dollars from Banco Estado (the official national bank) to finance 
the system between January to April 2007 and later on planned to use a credit from the IDB 
until the law 20.206 (regarding the increase of subsidy from the Administrative Counsel Fund) 
could be modified in the parliament (Cortázar, 2015). The Constitutional Tribunal, on 
September 2nd 2008, decided to make not constitutional the authorization of the credit bestowed 
by the Inter-American Development Bank (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008).  
In table 22, it can be seen the magnitude of the deficit, which doubled three years after the 
implementation of the Transantiago. 
As a consequence, President Bachelet had to state an emergency decree (article 32, 
number 20 from the Chilean Constitution) in order to authorize payments not authorized in the 
State Budget, which permits to access 2 percent (2%) of the total amount of the State Budget 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008).  Thus, the President authorized 
$453.705.220.952 Chilean pesos (roughly around US $6.7 million dollars) to be utilized in 
order to solvent the transportation system in Santiago (Ibid).  Her cabinet tried to cooperate 
with the opposition to increase in the subsidy, yet the opposition only approved only a thousand 
Chilean pesos (which is roughly US one dollar and fifty cents) (Ibid).   Thus, between the years 
of 2007 to 2009, the 2% of the annual State budget was utilized to finance the Transantiago. 
Bachelet once stated that it was important for the metropolitan transportation to not be 
financially supported by the 2% because that 2% was reserved for national disasters, 
foreshadowing the earthquake of 2010 (Cortázar, 2015).    
On the first of September of 2009, a new law was passed in the Chilean Congress, called 
law number 20.378 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2009).  This law is national 
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subsidy for public transportation has an annual budget of US $584 million dollars which can 
be annually readjusted in the Fiscal’s budget law (Ibid).  When Sebastian Piñera became 
President of Chile, his cabinet determined that in order for the Transantiago to be operative 
during his term (2010-2014), it needed annually $US three hundred million dollars more 
(Cortázar, 2015).  Later, on September 15th 2010, a consensus was agreed between the 
government and the opposition, where the fiscal budget would bestow US $300 million dollars 
more in order to finance the Transantiago and to balance the increases of tariffs (Ibid).  The 
same amount was also bestowed to the rest of Chilean regions in order to finance their 
transportation systems (Ibid).   
The policy did overpass the preliminary budget and ended in deficit, hence, it was not 
able to complete PTUS’ financial objective.   As a summary of the indicator policy efficiency 
it can be established that Bachelet’s administration did not respect since the Transantiago’s 
preliminary budget.  This provoked that by the year 2010, the Transantiago as a public policy, 
has created a deficit for the Chilean State of US $755,3 million dollars (Gómez-Lobo, 2012).  
Therefore, this objective has not been fulfilled.   
Finally, as a summary of the fulfillment of the objective, efficient use of resources, 
between the years 2007 to 2010, three indicators were used.  The results indicate that policy 
efficiency was not achieved, citizen participation was not fulfilled and the creation of a 
metropolitan authority of urban transportation was fulfilled.  Therefore, this objective was not 
fulfilled by the year 2010.       
6.1.2. Promotion of Social Equity 
In this sections, it will be studied if the policy has encouraged citizens to prefer the use of public 
transportation, comparing the use of this public good between 2006 (before the implementation 
of the Transantiago) and 2010.  
Table 23: Number of millions of people using the metropolitan subway between the years 2006 
to 2010. 
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amount of people using the subway (millions) 331 601 642 608 621 
Table created from Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano (2015, p. 8) 
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Table 24: Total amount of cars in the Metropolitan Region between 2006 and 2010 
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total number of 
private cars 1018261 1091947 161930 1195505 1272887 
Table based on the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 
Chile, 2007; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2008; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 
Chile, 2009, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2010) 
In table 23, it can be observed that the amount of people using the subway has doubled 
since the implementation of the policy, increasing the demand by 187%.  Table 24 shows that 
amount of private cars in Chile which have increased between 2006 to 2010 by 25%.  As a 
summary of the objective social equity, it can be established that it has not been fulfilled.  In 
spite that the use of the subway has increased, there has also been an increase in the use of cars 
in Santiago since the implementation of the Transantiago.  This is contradictory to the objective 
of the PTUS (MOPTT, 2000) to encourage citizens to prefer public transportation over the use 
of private automobiles.  Thus, this objective is not fulfilled.  
 
6.1.3 Environmental Sustainability 
Remembering that in the first sector of this chapter, associated with the results of the 
environmental sustainability, the following data must be observed knowing that there are other 
factors that affect the amount of air contamination in Santiago, such as industries, the weather 
pattern ‘la niña´, among other factors.  Furthermore, there was a contingent event regarding 
the economic relationship between Argentina and Chile which affected the air quality of 
Santiago.  Argentina, between the years of 2007 to 2009, intensified the cuts of supplies of 
natural gas, reaching almost to 100% (Figueroa et al, 2013).  This provoked that the Chilean 
industrial sector substituted natural gas to petroleum, as a consequence, increased the air 
pollution in Santiago, in spite of the new fleet of the Transantiago (Ibid).  Fortunately, from 
September 2009, when the regasification plant of natural liquefied gas in Quintero started 
operating, Chile’s dependency on Argentinean natural gas stopped (Ibid). Hence, the industrial 
sector commenced again to utilize this energy source, instead of petroleum (Ibid). 
As it can be observed from table 25, between the years 2006 to 2010 there have been 
no ‘emergency’ alerts and there has been a gradual decrease regarding ‘environmental alert’ 
days.  There were 21 ‘environmental alerts’ days on 2006, which was almost reduced by half 
by 2010, with only 11 days.  The almost complete renovation of the bus fleet by the year 2010 
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and the more intensive use of the subway generates the inference that the Transantiago could 
have generated a decrease in Santiago’s air pollution, specifically MP10 (Ibid).  It could be 
inferred that the Transantiago reduced its impact on air contamination, specifically the 
contribution towards the particular matter, in the Metropolitan Region due to its fleet 
renovation, which replaced old buses with buses that the standard of ‘Euro III’ or above (Ibid).   
Table 25: Number of days with ‘emergency’, ‘pre-emergency’ and ‘environmental alert’ 
between the years 2006 and 2010  
 Emergency Pre-Emergency Environmental Alert 
2006 0 3 21 
2007 0 4 27 
2008 0 8 21 
2009 0 0 23 
2010 0 2 11 
Table based on statistics from Health SEREMI (SEREMI Salud RM, 2016) 
Thus, it could be implied that when Chile stopped its dependency in Argentinean 
natural gas supplies, the benefits of the Transantiago became evident regarding the reductions 
in the level of contamination (Ibid).  It must be highlighted that Santiago’s winter of 2010 was 
the winter with less amount of ‘pre-emergencies’ days since the year 1997 (Ibid).  The 
reduction of air contamination from public transportation has a positive effect of savings by a 
yearly average of US $2.216 million dollars, in other words, the Chilean State has saved 12% 
of its healthcare budget (Ibid).  Furthermore, these savings are quite similar to the permanent 
subsidy for Santiago’s public transportation (Figueroa et al, 2013). 
As a summary of the study of the objective environmental sustainability, between the 
years 2007 to 2010, some clarifications must be stated.   It is necessary to observe these previous 
statistics through objective lens because Santiago has a unique geographical location as well as 
atmospheric conditions (thermal inversions during winter months) that do not promote the 
dispersion of air nor the adequate amount of rainfall to improve permanently the air quality.  
Also, there are other factors that may affect air quality such as the use of fossil fuels by large 
enterprises.     Transantiago implemented its new bus fleet on 2007 but only after Santiago’s 
industrial sector started utilizing natural gas on 2009, the effect of Transantiago’s eco-friendly 
buses became evident. It could be inferred that Santiago’s air quality improved due to the 
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implementation of the Transantiago.  Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a fulfilment 
of this objective.      
6.1.4 Security for people and goods 
It is important to state that the Metropolitan SEREMI of Transportation do not have statistics 
regarding the number of accidents in metropolitan subways.    It must be informed that the 
following statistics regarding the number of severity of accidents caused by buses, is 
considered as classified and of restricted divulgation by the Chilean Sub-Secretary of 
Transportation.  Hence, through the authorization by the Chilean Ministry of Transportation 
and Telecommunications, the following data has been processed.  Any type of distribution or 
copy of this information without the authorization of the Chilean government is constituted as 
a felony. 
Table 26: Number of accidents involving buses in Santiago between the years 2006 to 2010 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of accidents involving a 
bus  in Santiago 4951 3406 3291 3047 2937 
     Table replicated from Gómez-Lobo (2012, p. 8) 
Table 27: Number of passengers deceased, seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured 
in inter urban buses between the years 2006 and 2010 
Years Deceased Seriously Injured Medium Injured Mildly injured Total 
2006 3 136 128 1579 1846 
2007 2 136 110 1255 1503 
2008 2 95 98 1116 1311 
2009 3 109 78 980 1170 
2010 1 80 62 968 1111 
Table created by researcher based on statistics from the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and 
Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016) 
Table 26 shows that the number of accidents involving buses between 2006 and 2010 
in Santiago have significantly decreased.  These statistics were obtained from Andrés Gómez-
Lobo, a famous Chilean politician.  The researcher tried to contact CONASET and they refused 
to bestow this information.  Therefore, this information is classified and is very difficult to 
access. In his report, he states that his sources are the local police (Carabineros de Chile) and 
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CONASET.  Between 2006 and 2010, the number of buss accidents in Santiago have been 
reduced to 40,67% and there has been a reduction of 2554 annual deaths regarding to bus 
accidents.   
Table 27 and graph 2 were created by the researcher based on statistics given by Chilean 
Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016).  
In table 27, it can be observed that there is not a significant difference regarding the deaths of 
passengers in bus accidents between the years 2006 to 2010.  Nevertheless, the changes in 
seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured are dramatic: there was a reduction in 
every type of injury with a minimum reduction of 38,7%.  Considering the total of passengers 
who have suffered an accident (which caused injury or death), in 2006 the number was 1846 
while as in 2010 it was 1111, which represents a reduction of 39,9%.  In 2006, those who had 
suffered mild injuries were 1579 while as in 2010 the number decreased to 968 persons, which 
is a reduction of 38,7% in mild injuries.   Regarding medium injuries, in 2010 there 128 injured 
and in 2010 there were only 62, which represents a reduction of 51,6%.  Finally, in 2006 there 
were 136 seriously injured passengers, while as in 2010 there were 80, which symbolizes a 
reduction of 41.2%.  
Graph 2: Number of passengers deceased, seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured 
in inter urban buses between the years 2006 and 2010 
 
Graph created by researcher based on statistics from the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and 
Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016) 
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In graph 2, it is clearly illustrated in the line graph the steady decline of accidents within 
the three categories. It can also be spotted distinctly the reduction of injuries in all three 
categories.  As a consequence, it can be inferred the direct relationship between the 
implementation of the Transantiago and the reduction of injured bus passengers.  
As a summary of the study of the objective security people and goods, between the years 
2007 to 2010, several observations can be established.  This is the least mentioned objective 
due to its confidential nature.  The increased security of passengers in the metropolitan public 
transportation has proven that the Transantiago is safer public transportation system compared 
to the former public transportation system in Santiago.  As a conclusion, the government can 
confidently state that they have provided to civil society a more secure public transportation, 
thus fulfilling their initial objectives. 
6.1.5. Summary of Transantiago’s fulfilment of objectives by the year 2010 
As a conclusion of this section, table 28 narrates if the Transantiago has fulfilled its objectives   
by the year 2010. It can be analyzed that out of the four objectives, some were fulfilled to a 
certain extent while others were not.  Regarding the efficient use of resources, by the year 2010, 
half of the sub-objectives were fulfilled. The promotion of more social equity was not fulfilled.   
The objectives ‘security for people and goods’ and ‘environmental sustainability’ were 
fulfilled.   In conclusion, the Transantiago did not fulfill all of its objectives.     
Table 28: Transantiago’s objectives fulfillment by the year 2010 
Specific 
objectives (PTUS) 
Conceptualization of the objectives from the 
Investigative Committee 
Fulfilled 
by the 
year 
2010 
Efficient use of 
resources 
Citizens 
Participation 
Establishment of a 'citizen 
inspector' No 
Citizens respect the norms needed 
to implement policy No 
Institutional 
modernization at a 
metropolitan level 
Creation of 
Metropolitan 
Authority of 
Urban 
Transport 
Establishment 
of a 
metropolitan 
transportation 
authority 
Yes 
Creation of a 
Coordination 
Committee of 
Yes 
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Public 
Transportation 
Reformulation 
of the 
Administrative 
Counsel Funds 
Yes 
Policy efficiency Respect towards the pre-established budget No 
Promotion of 
more social equity 
Maintain and increase the use of metropolitan public 
transport No 
Environmental  
sustainability 
Reduce public transportation´s contribution to the 
atmospheric contamination Yes 
Security for 
people and goods Improve the security of public transportation Yes 
Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT, 2000) 
6.2 Transantiago’s policy approval between the years 2007 to 2010 
The support of the Transantiago by civil society has never been continuously elevated.  
Bachelet’s approval plummeted after the Big Bang, primarily because one of her biggest 
campaign promises ended as a “failure of epic proportions” as it can be observed in table 29 
(Cortázar, 2015, p. 15).  
Table 29: Citizen Poll between March 2007 to January 2010: Do you approve the way Michelle 
Bachelet and her administration is managing the “Transantiago”?  
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Table created with statistics from Adimark (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010)  
Table 30 studies civil society’s approval rate of the Transantiago between the months 
of March 2010 to December 2010.   Specifically, how Piñera’s administration managed the 
policy.  The average of approval was 35,6%.  The range of approval was between 30% to 46%.  
The highest approval rate of the Transantiago during his first year as president was 46% on 
April 2010.  The lowest approval rate, 30%, occurred two months in a row: July and August 
2010.     
 
Table 30: Citizen Poll between March 2010 to December 2010: Do you approve the way 
Sebastian Piñera and his administration is managing the “Transantiago”?  
Months Percentage 
March 2010 41 
April 2010 46 
May 2010 38 
June 2010 37 
July 2010 30 
August 2010 30 
September 2010 35 
October 2010 34 
November 2010 33 
December 2010 32 
Table created with statistics from Adimark (2010)  
Tables 29 and 30 show the approval rate of the policy between the years 2007 to 2010.  
The range of approval during this period was between 9% to 46%.  The average of approval 
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between these three years was 22,36%.  Studying both tables, it can be established that civil 
society approved more how Piñera’s administration managed the policy rather than Bachelet’s 
administration.  In other words, Piñera’s average was 35,6%, a difference of 17,02% when 
compared with Bachelet’s average, 18, 58%.  During both administrations, the approval rate of 
the Transantiago was never 50% or higher.     The most important inference established in this 
thesis while studying the objective for security for people and goods is the direct relationship 
between the implementation of the Transantiago and the reduction of injured bus passengers.  
The total number of accidents has diminished by 39,9%: mild injuries by 38,7%; medium 
injuries by 51,6% and serious injuries by 41.2%.   If this confidential information were to be 
released to the press, it could be inferred that the approval rate towards the Transantiago would 
improve.      
6.3 Summary Chapter: Evaluation of Transantiago as a policy failure or policy success by 
2010 
Remembering that the third sub-question was “to what extent was the Transantiago a policy 
failure or a policy success in 2010?” it can be concluded that Transantiago continued to be a 
policy failure by the year 2010.  After three years of its initial implementation, the policy did 
not have an approval rate of over 50% and it did not achieve all of its objectives to completion.  
Therefore, under the conceptualization used in this thesis, it can be established that the 
Transantiago as a public policy by the year 2010 was still a policy failure.  It had recovered 
from a political crisis in the year 2007, after the Big Bang, yet it hasn’t achieved to a full extent 
its goals and it hasn’t been approved by more that 50% of civil society.     
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this section, there will be a response to all three sub-questions and the main thesis question, 
a theoretical discussion, a methodological discussion and a section dedicated to practical 
findings.  
7.1 Answering the three sub questions and the main question 
The first sub-question was ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy 
success in 2007?’ In this section, the objectives and the civil society’s approval of the policy 
were studied between its initial implementation until the end of 2007. The entirety of objectives 
was not achieved and the average citizen’s approval of the policy on the year 2007 was 12,94% 
and never achieved higher than 17,6% (Adimark, 2006; Adimark, 2007).   The response of this 
question succinctly stated is that the Transantiago was a policy failure by the end of 2007.    
The second sub-question was ‘how did the policy implementation continue after the 
initial failure?’  The goal of this question was to answer through a theoretical lens (rational 
decision making approach or historical institutionalism approach) could explain the structure 
of how the policy continued after its failed implementation and the behavior of policymakers 
between the year 2007 and 2010.  Therefore, two predictions (structure and the role of the 
policymaker) were established.  The policy’s structure did not follow Parsons’ policy cycle 
because the policy was affected by five contingent events, a critical juncture and a historical 
lock-in. The role of the policymakers, as change agents, carried out continuous change rather 
than episodic change furthermore because the policy itself followed a continuous change rather 
than an episodic change.   Therefore, the predictions of historical institutionalism regarding 
‘structure’ and ‘role of the policymaker’ was accepted and both predictions of rational decision 
making rejected. 
The third sub-question was ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a 
policy success in 2010?’ In this section, the objectives and the civil society’s approval of the 
policy were studied between the years 2007 to 2010 in order to establish if the policy was a 
success or failure by the end of 2010.  Between 2007 and 2010, the average approval rate was 
of 25,15% and never equal or above 50%. (Adimark, 2007; Adimark, 2008; Adimark, 2009; 
Adimark, 2010).   It could be inferred that if citizens knew about the reduction in accidents after 
the implementation of the Transantiago, the policy could have had an approval rate of over 
50%.  Nevertheless, the response of this question is that the Transantiago continues to be a 
policy failure by the end of 2010.        
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The three responses from each sub-question were essential to be able to respond the 
thesis question: “between historical institutionalism and rational decision making, which 
theory can explain more holistically the evaluation of the initial three years of implementation 
of the Transantiago?” Remembering that the topic of this thesis is policy failure and the case 
study is the Transantiago, several affirmations can be established.  Comparing both theories, 
the Transantiago, as a case of policy failure, can be more holistically explained through 
historical institutionalism approach rather than rational decision making approach.  This is 
justified because the case does not follow Parsons’ policy cycle (1995) nor Chilean 
policymakers follow a strict episodic change behavior.   
 Historical institutionalism explains more holistically, more depth and detail, the 
reasons why the Transantiago continued to be a failure after three years of its implementation.  
The 6 indicators of path dependence, established by Mahoney and Schensul (2006) and its 
critical juncture were identified in the case.  Therefore, evaluating its implementation, on 2010, 
shows that historical institutionalism is the most adequate theory to explain Transantiago’s 
policy failure.   
7.2 Theoretical Discussion, Implications and Recommendations  
In this section, there will be a theoretical discussion about the topic of the thesis, policy failure 
and to observe if the theories about historical institutionalism and rational decision making 
approach can be utilized to explain such phenomena.   The main theoretical lesson searched in 
this thesis is finding a theory that could aid academics to recover from policy failure.   It has 
been studied to great lengths, both theories and their application to the case study.  
From a historical institutionalism point of view, a recovery process is evolutionary, 
continuous and takes time (Mahoney, 2000; Weick and Quinn, 1999).  Recovery from policy 
failure cannot be immediate through this lens because the policy is not in a vacuum: it is 
affected by political actors and external events that delay or impediment the ability of 
institutions to carry out their initial goals.   From a rational decision making point of view, a 
recovery process is an efficient process, where specific goals are obtained by precise steps 
through a timetable that is respected by policymakers (Parsons, 1995).  Policies follow a certain 
route, if the policy is unsuccessful, they implement the same cycle all over again (Ibid).   
As a consequence of this analysis, rational decision making theory and approach is no 
longer valid to explain modern public policy failures.  In an ideal world, the theory’s policy 
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cycle would operate like a clock: efficiently, without errors.   If there is an error, it could be 
completely replaced by a new policy.   This theory is useful to teach students of public 
administration regarding the theoretical framework of a policy cycle. The theory of a policy 
cycle under this lens is not identical to the implementation of an actual policy.  This theory 
needs to be updated: the implementation of policies in the real word is not a linear cycle.  
Policymakers return to the writing board if a policy implementation fails, they do not wait until 
a formal evaluation occurs.   
Historical institutionalism is more efficient and useful for academics to comprehend 
and amend policy failures in comparison with rational decision making.  This theory explains 
why some policies cannot be conceptualized as successful policies, not due to the design of the 
policy, it is due to how policies are affected by external factors that cannot be controlled by 
institutions (political actors, history, environment, contingent events, among other factors). 
Through the analysis carried out in this thesis, historical institutionalism explains more 
holistically the lack of recovery process, while as rational decision making approach does not.  
An institutional recovery process is a continuous process, vulnerable to external factors, history 
and the limitations of the State. When the policy fails, it must overcome its initial errors in 
order to continue to provide a public good.  Therefore, a recovery process cannot follow a 
rational decision making approach because when a policy fails, the same policy cycle does not 
occur again, it evolves and adapts to its surroundings.      
7.3 Methodological implications  
This section will carry out a reflection of the methodological approach used in this thesis.  This 
thesis was a single case study, utilizing Blatter and Haverland’s (2012) Congruence Analysis 
approach (CON). The main methodological goal was to study the implementation case of the 
Transantiago intensely and not extensively (Sartori, 1970). The thesis was of qualitative nature 
due to the utilization of theories, even the analysis quantitative data was in a qualitative manner.  
A case study was preferred in comparison to implementing a large-n comparison study because 
the benefit of studying specific, detailed about policy failure permits to create new theory in 
the field of public administration.    The disadvantages of carrying out a case study intensively 
is the need to obtain very specific information and the difficulty to generalize about the 
findings.   
The advantage of implementing a CON case study was the ability to carry out a thesis 
without carrying out interviews or surveys.  The shortcomings of the approach and the main 
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methodological issue confronted in this thesis was the lack of access to information.  The 
information needed to carry out a CON approach case study based on a Chilean public policy 
is very difficult to obtain.   First of all, not all of the information utilized in this thesis is of 
public domain.  When such information is denied, a citizen has the right to apply to the 
‘Transparency Law’ in order to access the necessary information.  Nevertheless, some 
institutions stated that the information did not exist, while politicians such as Gómez-Lobos 
(2012) wrote a paper based on the data that the MTT would not bestow the researcher.   Think 
tanks do not carry out papers with the exact time frame of the thesis, therefore their data was 
discarded.  Some books were not available at Leiden University, there was Cortázar’s memoires 
that had to be bought from Chile while the PTUS manuscript existed in a physical version at 
the Chilean Library of Congress.  In spite of these limitations, the researcher obtained all the 
information necessary in order to carry out this thesis.   
The main methodological reflection is that information within the academic community 
is not shared.  The lack of information regarding failed public policies do not permit academics 
to carry out large-n studies or generalize about the subject depending on the region.  Therefore, 
it impedes the creation, validation or dismissal of theories.  This should be amended.  
7.4 Practical reflection   
This section will narrate the practical learnings from carrying out a case study regarding a failed 
public policy. From an academic point of view, it can be recommended to carry out large-n, 
quantitative comparative studies in areas such as health care, justice or transportation in order 
to generalize about the concept of policy failure and success in specific public administration 
areas.   Large-n, comparative qualitative studies should also be carried out, by comparing how 
authorities in high levels address failed public policies. A Co-Variational Analysis (COV) 
should be carried out to analyze how Brazil, Chile and Colombia, similar countries with similar 
public transportation policies (BRT, the Transantiago and the Transmilenio) have different 
policy outcomes (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).  Additionally, it is necessary to update the 
articles that have already been published in the past about the Transantiago.  It is necessary to 
enrich McConnell’s (2015) operationalization of ‘successful public policy’.  Besides the 
fulfilment of outcomes and citizen support towards a policy, it is necessary to include citizens’ 
knowledge regarding initial policies objectives.  By studying if citizens know the initial goals 
of a policy, this might change their approval towards the policy itself.  Hence, this suggestion 
could explain more holistically what a successful public policy is from the lens of civil society.  
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 From a governmental point of view, there are several recommendations in order to 
amend a failed policy.  First, recognize publicly the errors of the implementation to civil society 
and state that the government is implementing solutions as efficiently as they can. Second, set 
up a plan with short term goals and long term goals in order to amend the policy with the aid 
of academics from the area of public administration.   Third, carry out a survey with the 
population in order to know which are their main concerns and their main suggestions to amend 
the policy.  Fourth, obtain support from all sectors (civil society, entrepreneurs and the 
opposition) in order to implement the new solutions.  Fifth, if there is a lack of funds, it is 
necessary to obtain loans from international organizations.     
The main topic of this thesis is policy failure.  The expectations were that after a certain 
amount of years, a policy could be ‘fixed’.  The selection of the thesis’ case study, the 
Transantiago, is a complex case.  Policymakers tried to fix the policy and in a perfect black 
and white world, it would have been amended.  Yet after several years, this policy was not able 
to change its course because it was affected by several contingencies, a historical lock-in and 
many other factors mentioned in this thesis.  More studies are needed to conclude the feasibility 
of amending complex failed policies.  It can be concluded that the expectation of recovering 
from a failed policy, in the Chilean metropolitan public transportation, was not feasible.  Yet, 
this failed public policy was about transportation and it is necessary to study other areas of 
failed public policies such as healthcare, environmental issues, among many other issues in 
order to establish in the academic sphere a universal generalization regarding how complex 
failed policies can be amended or analyzed.   
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